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The Supreme Court's
Interpretation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act's Anti-Retaliation
Provision in Kasten v. SaintGobain Performance Plastics
Corporation: Putting Policy Over
Plain Language?
by Lawrence D. Rosenthal*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Similar to statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
2
(Title VII),1 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and
3
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), all of which contain anti5
retaliation provisions,4 the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which
protects employees with respect to wages and hours, also contains such

* Associate Dean for Academics and a Professor of Legal Writing, Northern Kentucky
University, Salmon P. Chase College of Law. Vanderbilt University Law School (J.D.,
1993); Georgetown University Law Center (LL.M., 1998).
The Author would like to thank Ms. Joanna Berding and Mr. Gregory Ingalsbe for the
assistance they provided during the writing of this Article.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006 & Supp. 11 2009).
4. Title VII's anti-retaliation provision can be found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006);
the ADEA's anti-retaliation provision can be found at 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2006); and the
ADA's anti-retaliation provision can be found at 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (2006).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2006 & Supp. 1I 2009).
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a provision. Unfortunately, not all of these provisions are identical,
which has led courts to interpret them differently, granting more
protection under some provisions and less protection under others.7
The United States Supreme Court has been active in defining the
contours of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision,' and the Court recently
interpreted one aspect of the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision.9 At
issue in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.'0 was
whether oral complaints 1 constituted "protected activity" under the
FLSA. 2 Before Kasten, there was a circuit split with respect to two
related issues regarding the FLSA. The first issue was whether internal
complaints were protected,"3 and the second was, assuming internal
complaints were protected, whether they needed to be written. 4

6. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
7. For example, some courts have indicated that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision
provided more protection than the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision. See, e.g., Ball v.
Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that "the cause of action

for retaliation under the FLSA is much more circumscribed" than the same cause of action
under Title VII); Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993) (comparing Title
Virs "broadU" anti-retaliation provision to the FLSA's narrower anti-retaliation provision),
overruled in part by Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325
(2011).
8. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868 (2011) (holding that
third-party retaliation claims are actionable under Title VIrs anti-retaliation provision);
Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271,273 (2009) (holding that an employee's
responses to an employer's internal investigation of a potential Title VII violation
constitute protected activity under Title VII's anti-retaliation provision); Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,60-61 (2006) (deciding what constitutes an "adverse
employment action" under Title VII's anti-retaliation provision); Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v.
Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272-74 (2001) (discussing, but not specifically deciding, what
standard applies to Title VIrs anti-retaliation provision's opposition clause); and Robinson
v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (holding that former employees can sue under
Title Vii's anti-retaliation provision).
9. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1329.
10. 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
11. The meaning of the term "complaint" is an important part of this Article. The
Author will use the term in its informal sense when describing the situation in which an
employee "complains" to an employer about a workplace situation. The Author will,
however, uses the term "complaint" in its formal, legal context toward the end of this
Article, when arguing why the word should be interpreted in that manner in the FLSA's
anti-retaliation provision.
12. 131 S. Ct. at 1329.
13. Compare Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 44 (1st Cir.) (holding that
internal complaints are protected), amended by 5 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1024 (1st
Cir. 1999), with Lambert, 10 F.3d at 55 (holding that internal complaints are not
protected).
14. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 838-39 (7th
Cir. 2009) (holding that written, but not oral, internal complaints are protected), rev'd, 131
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Although the Court did not squarely address the first issue, its
conclusion that the FLSA covered certain types of oral complaints, along
with the Court's formulation of a test to be used when determining
whether certain complaints are protected, certainly suggested that
internal complaints were, in fact, protected. 5
While Kasten was consistent with the goal of protecting employees who
voice concerns over potential FLSA violations, it is not so clear that the
decision is consistent with the language of the FLSA's anti-retaliation
provision. In fact, the Court might have stretched the text of the FLSA's
anti-retaliation provision just about as far as it could in order to reach
what it considered to be the "right" result.1 6 This broad interpretation
is consistent with how the Court has liberally construed anti-retaliation
provisions found in other employment-related statutes; 17 however,
many of those provisions are drafted much more broadly than the
FLSA's anti-retaliation provision.' 8
This Article will examine the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision, and
it will focus on whether its language covers internal complaints. Section
II will examine the text of the provision and compare it to other
employment-related, anti-retaliation provisions.' 9 Section III will
examine the circuit split regarding whether internal complaints are
protected under the FLSA.2 9 Section IV will focus on the Court's

S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
15. See Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1329. Justices Scalia and Thomas also agreed that the
majority's opinion that oral complaints are covered suggested that all suffliciently specific
internal complaints are covered, even though the Court did not squarely address this issue.
Id. at 1341 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Specifically, when addressing the majority's claim that
it was not answering the question of whether internal complaints in general are protected,
Justice Scalia noted that the majority "adopts a test for Tiled any complaint' that assumes
a 'yes' answer-and that makes no sense otherwise." Id.
16. See infra section V.
17. The Supreme Court has given an expansive interpretation to Title VII's antiretaliation provision. See, e.g., Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868 (holding that third-party
retaliation claims are actionable under Title VII's anti-retaliation provision); Crawford, 555
U.S. at 273 (holding that an employee's responses to an employer's internal investigation
of a potential Title VII violation constitute protected activity under Title VII's antiretaliation provision); Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 60-61 (deciding what constitutes
an "adverse employment action" under Title VII's anti-retaliation provision); and Robinson,
519 U.S. at 346 (holding that former employees can sue under Title VITs anti-retaliation
provision).
18. See infra section H.
19. See infra section I.
20. See infra section I. This Article will not focus on the issue the Court addressed
in Kasten-the distinction between written and oral complaints. Rather, the Article will
focus on the distinction between internal complaints and complaints made to courts or
administrative agencies.

462

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

opinion in Kasten and on Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion.21 Finally,
the Article will argue that although the Court in Kasten provided more
protection to FLSA plaintiffs, it did so despite the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision's narrow language, which suggests that internal complaints are not protected. Did the Court put policy ahead of statutory
language, or is the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision broad enough to
protect internal complaints? Although most courts agree that the Court
"got it right," it is possible the Court did so only by stretching the
FLSA's text just about as far as it possibly could.
II.

THE FLSA's ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION AND OTHER
EMPLOYMENT-RELATED, ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISIONS
The FLSA's anti-retaliation provision can be found at 29 U.S.C.
§ 215(a)(3). This provision prohibits employers from:
discharg[ing] or in any other manner discriminat[ing] against any
employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted
or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this
chapter,or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or
has served or is about to serve on an industry committee.23

Clearly, employees are protected from retaliation only if they engage in
any of the specific activities identified in this provision.24 Importantly,
nowhere is there any protection provided for an employee who voices,
expresses, or raises any FLSA concerns to his employer or for anyone
who "opposets]" an FLSA violation.25 The absence of any such language

21. See infra section IV.
22. Although the Author argues that the FLSA's language does not protect any internal
complaints, Congress's use of the word"filed" certainly undermines the conclusion that oral
complaints are covered. Even during oral argument of this case, Justice Kennedy joked
about this issue when he referred to a question that Justice Scalia had just "filed" when
Justice Scalia asked counsel a question. Oral Argument at 12:10, Kasten, 131 S. Ct. 1325
(No. 09-834), availableat http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2010/2010-09_834/argument. Also during oral arguments, Justice Scalia expressed his belief that using the term
"filed" when referring to an oral communication was a drastic stretch of the ordinary use
of that word; he did this when he stated his belief that counsel for Kasten was not "filing"
an argument before the Court. Id. at 11:48. Similarly, Justice Alito expressed his
skepticism when he sarcastically asked counsel for Kasten whether he was "filing" his
comments with the Court during oral argument. Id. at 4:07.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
24. Id.
25. Id. This varies significantly from Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, which
contains an opposition clause that does cover internal complaints. Compare 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination against an employee who has "opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter"), with 29 U.S.C.
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distinguishes this provision from many other anti-retaliation provisions
found in other employment-related statutes.
As previously noted, many employment-related statutes contain antiretaliation provisions; however, the language in the other federal
statutes is much broader.26 For example, Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision provides the following:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management committee
controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including onthe-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for
a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or
applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made
an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter,or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, orparticipatedin any manner in an
27
investigation,proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.

Under Title VII, employees are protected if they oppose what they
28
reasonably believe to be an unlawful employment practice, and they
29
The
are also protected if they participatein a Title VII proceeding.
Court has interpreted this provision broadly to further the goal of
protecting employees; ° however, one difference between Title VII and
8
the FLSA is the absence of an "opposition clause" from the FLSA. ' It
some courts to interpret the
is the absence of this language that caused
2
FLSA in a more restrictive manner.1

§ 215(aX3) (not containing a similar provision).
26. See supra note 4.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added).
28. Id. Although the Supreme Court has not yet squarely addressed the issue of
whether a plaintiff must oppose a practice that is actually unlawful, all circuit courts of
appeals have incorporated a reasonableness standard when determining whether the
plaintiff must oppose a practice that is, in fact, unlawful. See Lawrence D. Rosenthal,
Reading Too Much Into What the Court Doesn't Write: How Some Federal Courts Have
Limited Title VIi's ParticipationClause'sProtectionsAfter Clark County School District v.
Breeden, 83 WASH. L. REV. 345, 356 (2008). The Supreme Court had an opportunity to
resolve that issue in Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001), but the
Court decided not to answer that particular question. 532 U.S. at 270.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
30. See supra note 17.
31. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (prohibiting discrimination against an employee
who has "opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter"), with 29 U.S.C. § 215(aX3) (not containing a similar provision).
32. See, e.g., Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting the
difference in language between the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision and Title VII's antiretaliation provision), abrogatedby Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131
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Other federal employment-related statutes also contain anti-retaliation
provisions with "opposition" language, including the ADEA," the
ADA,' and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)" Had all of
these anti-retaliation provisions been drafted identically, their interpretation would most likely be consistent; however, because of the
differences in the provisions' language, courts have not interpreted these
provisions similarly. And one area where the courts differ is whether
the opposition concept from Title VII and other statutes should apply to
the FLSA. While most courts protect what seems to be FLSA opposition,36 some courts take a strict approach and limit the FLSA's protec-

S. Ct. 1325 (2011). See also infra section MI(B).
33. The relevant text of the ADEA's anti-retaliation provision is below:
It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees
or applicants for employment... because such individual... has opposed any
practice made unlawful by this section, or because such individual... has made
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or litigation under this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2006) (emphasis added).
34. The relevant text of the ADA's anti-retaliation provision is below:
No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has
opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such
individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
35. The relevant text of the FMIA's anti-retaliation provision is below:
(a) Interference with rights
(1) Exercise of rights
It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the
exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this
subchapter.
(2) Discrimination
It shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner
discriminateagainst any individualfor opposing any practice made unlawful
by this subchapter.
(b) Interference with proceedings or inquiries
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge or in any other manner
discriminate against any individual because such individual(1) has filed any charge, or has instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceeding, under or related to this subchapter;
(2) has given, or is about to give, any information in connection with any
inquiry or proceeding relating to any right provided under this subchapter; or
(3) has testified, or is about to testify, in any inquiry or proceeding relating
to any right provided under this subchapter.
29 U.S.C. § 2615 (2006) (emphasis added).
36. See infra section M.A.
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tion only to those employees who file external complaints.3 7 One circuit
took a middle-ground approach, concluding that internal complaints
were protected so long as they were in writing.3" This three-way split
will now be addressed.
III.

THE THREE-WAY CIRCUIT SPLIT

Before Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.,39 most
courts agreed that an employee's internal FLSA complaints were
protected;4" however, courts took different routes to reach this conclusion.
Some courts focused on what they believed to be the policy behind the
FLSA's anti-retaliation provision and concluded that protecting only the
actions specified in the provision, which do not include internal
"opposition," would frustrate that policy.4 1 Other courts reached a proemployee outcome by looking at the provision and concluding either: (1)
it was clear that internal complaints were protected; or (2) that the
provision was ambiguous and, therefore, the court was free to utilize
other tools of statutory construction to conclude that internal complaints
were protected.4 2 Regardless of how the courts determined that
internal complaints were protected, that approach was the majority
position before Kasten and will likely continue to be after Kasten.4s

37. See, e.g., Lambert, 10 F.3d at 55 (deciding not to provide protection for internal
complaints); see also infra section m(B). As will be discussed later, after the Supreme
Court's opinion in Kasten, few, if any, courts will continue to deny protection for employees
who complain only to their employer; but see Flick v. Am. Fin. Res., Inc., CV 10-3084, 2012
WL 5386157, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31,2012), and cases cited therein (noting that Kasten did
not answer the internal/external issue and sticking with Second Circuit precedent that
internal complaints are not protected).
38. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 839-40 (7th
Cir. 2009) (protecting only written complaints), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
39. 131 S.Ct. 1325 (2011).
40. See Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, LLC, 529 F.3d 617, 625-26 (5th Cir. 2008)
(collecting cases).
41. Id. at 626 (adopting this approach "because it better captures the anti-retaliation
goals of [the FLSA]"); see also Chennisi v. Commc'ns Constr. Grp., LLC, No. 04-4826, 2005
WL 387594, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2005). The anti-retaliation provision's purpose was
not to protect employees, but rather to allow for the government to monitor employer
compliance. See Brief for Respondent at 22-24, Kasten, 131 U.S. 1325 (No. 09-834), 2010
WL 3251632. Protecting internal complaints does not advance this goal, as internal
complaints do nothing to inform the government of an employer's FLSA compliance. Id.
42. See Lambert v. Ackerly, 180 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999) (deciding that the
statutory language supported a broad interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision);
Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 41 (1st Cir.) (deciding that the statutory
language was ambiguous), amended by 5 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1024 (1st Cir. 1999).
43. Since Kasten, several courts have noted (or assumed) that internal complaints are
protected by the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision. See Maynor v. Dow Chem. Co., 430 F.
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A.

The MajorityApproach-Internal ComplaintsAre Protected
Before Kasten, most courts agreed that an employee's internal
complaints were within the scope of the FLSA's anti-retaliation
provision's protection. This subsection of the Article will discuss those
opinions and analyze how those courts reached this pro-employee
outcome.
1. The First Circuit's Opinion in Valerio. The United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was one of many courts of appeals
that took a pro-employee position on whether internal complaints were
protected under the FLSA." In Valerio v. Putnam Associates, Inc.,45
the plaintiff claimed she was entitled to overtime pay and that she was
terminated in response to her internal complaint about that issue. The
lower court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on the
plaintiff's FLSA and state-law retaliation claims, holding that the
plaintiff's internal memorandum was not protected under the FLSA or
state law.4 6
After addressing the amount of overtime pay owed to the plaintiff, the
court addressed the retaliation issue.4 7 The First Circuit acknowledged
that the issue was one of first impression in that circuit, and it phrased
the issue as being:
[Wihether [the] FLSA's prohibition on terminating an employee who
"has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceeding" under or related to the FLSA protects an employee who
has lodged a written internal complaint with his or her employer but
has not filed a judicial or administrative complaint.'

App'x 313, 313 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2011); Shakib v. Back Bay Rest. Grp., Inc., No. 10cv4564(DMC)(JAD), 2011 WL 4594654, at *7 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2011); Dean v. Specialized Sec.
Response, No. 09-515, 2011 WL 3734238, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2011); Johnson v.
Mikolajewski & Assocs., No. 3:09-cv-405, 2011 WL 3273560, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 1, 2011);
Thayer Corp. v. Reed, No. 2:10-cv-00423-JAW, 2011 WL 2682723, at *14 (D. Me. July 11,
2011); Deeley v. Genesis Heathcare Corp., No. 10-1242, 2011 WL 3240828, at *1 n.3 (E.D.
Pa. July 29, 2011); Palmer v. PSC Indus. Outsourcing, L.P., No. H-09-3194, 2011 WL
1230206, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2011).
44. Valerio, 173 F.3d at 44.
45. 173 F.3d 35 (1st Cir.), amended by 5 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) (1st Cir. 1999).
46. Id. at 37-38.
47. Id. at 38, 40.
48. Id. at 41.
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After acknowledging the circuit split, and after acknowledging that this
was a "close question," the court concluded that such activity was
49
protected.
The court disagreed with the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit's opinion in Lambert v. Genesee Hospital," which had
concluded that internal complaints were not protected, and it determined
that the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision was ambiguous. 5' The court
noted that the word complaint could include internal expressions of
"protest, censure, resentment, or injustice conveyed to an employer."52
The court relied on Webster's Third New InternationalDictionaryfor the
definition of complaint, and it also noted that Congress failed to specify
that the complaint needed to be filed with a court or agency; therefore,
the court believed that internal complaints could have been contemplated by the word complaint.5" The court also noted that Congress used
the phrase "any complaint," which supported the proposition that
internal complaints were protected.54
The court then analyzed the word filed." Despite noting that the
word filed provided the "strongest case" for non-ambiguity, the court
again relied on Webster's Third New International Dictionary and
concluded that the secondary definition of filed, "to place (as a paper or
an instrument) on file among the legal or official records of an office
esp[ecially] by formally receiving, endorsing, and entering," allowed for
an interpretation that the FLSA covered internal complaints.5" The
court noted that the definition is "sufficiently elastic to encompass an
internal complaint made to a private employer with the expectation the
employer will place it on file among the employer's official records."57
To further support its conclusion that the statute was ambiguous, the
court noted that if the statute required filings with a court or agency,
the statutory language, "or instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceeding under or related to [the FLSA]," would be unnecessary
surplusage. 8 Then, relying on the canon of statutory construction that

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.

10 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1993), overruled in part by Kasten, 131 S. Ct. 1325.
Valerio, 173 F.3d at 41.
Id.
53. Id.; see also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 464 (1971).
54. Valerio, 173 F.3d at 42 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 41.
56. Id. at 41-42 (alteration in original); see also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 849 (1971).
57. Valerio, 173 F.3d at 41-42.
58. Id. at 42 (noting that the language would be "surplusage" because the "instituted
or caused to be instituted" language would be repeating the "filed any complaint"
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"courts may assume that Congress used two terms because it intended
each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning," the court
concluded that the statute was ambiguous. 59 As a result, the court
looked at other tools of statutory construction.6 °
After noting that the FLSA's legislative history did not provide much
guidance,"' the court looked at Supreme Court case law interpreting
the FLSA.6 2 It noted that the Court had given the FLSA a generous
construction, 3 and it also observed that "Congress sought to secure
compliance with the substantive provision[] of the Act by having
'employees seeking to vindicate rights claimed to have been denied' lodge
complaints or supply information to officials regarding allegedly
substandard employment practices and conditions."' The court also
noted that the Supreme Court mentioned that the FLSA "must not be
interpreted in a narrow, grudging manner," and that the FLSA's
"remedial and humanitarian" purpose would not be furthered by a
narrow interpretation.6 5
The court next addressed more policy considerations.66 Specifically,
it noted that if only formal complaints to a court or agency were
protected, employers could retaliate against employees so long as the

language). During oral argument in Kasten, Justice Scalia disagreed with Petitioner's
position that the "instituted or caused to be instituted" language would be mere surplusage,
noting that an individual could file a complaint with the Department of Labor that does
not result in a proceeding. Oral Argument, supra note 22, at 13:29.
59. Valerio, 173 F.3d at 42 (quoting Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995)).
60. Id.
61. Id. The court then noted that it would have looked at how the federal administrative agencies have interpreted this provision; however, neither the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission nor the Department of Labor had taken a "definite stance as to
the proper interpretation to give [to] § 215(a)(3)." Id. at 42 n.5. The First Circuit was also
critical of how the EEOC reached its pro-employee conclusion because the EEOC simply
relied on the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Love v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383 (10th
Cir. 1984). Valerio, 173 F.3d at 42 n.5. In Kasten, during oral argument before the Court,
and also in the Respondent's Brief on the Merits, the Respondent's counsel pointed to the
colloquy that took place during the debate which suggested that only external complaints
were protected; specifically, the colloquy referred to "malicious complaints," Oral Argument,
supra note 22, at 42:42, which would apply only to an employee's complaint to an external
agency or to a court. See Brief for Respondent supra note 41, at 21.
62. Valerio, 173 F.3d at 42-43. Specifically, the First Circuit looked at the Supreme
Court's opinions in Tennessee Coal, Iron& R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590
(1944), and in Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
63. Valerio, 173 F.3d at 43.
64. Id. at 42 (quoting Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292).
65. Id. at 43 (quoting Tennessee Coal, 321 U.S. at 597).
66. Id.
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67
employers did so prior to the employees' filing of formal complaints.
A narrow interpretation of the Act would also discourage employees from
bringing FLSA concerns to an employer.68 Additionally, the court noted
that a narrow interpretation would provide "an incentive for [an]
employer to fire an employee as soon as possible after learning the
employee believed he was being treated illegally." 9 Finally, the court
observed that a narrow interpretation would "create an atmosphere of
intimidation" and defeat the FLSA's purpose of encouraging employees
to secure their FLSA rights.7 ° The First Circuit therefore concluded
that "the animating spirit of the Act is best served by a construction of
[the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision] under which the filing of a
relevant complaint with the employer no less than with a court or
agency may give rise to a retaliation claim." 71 Thus, by first concluding
that the FLSA's language was ambiguous and then focusing on what it
believed to be the FLSA's purpose, the First Circuit reached a proemployee outcome. 7

2. The Approach Taken Within the Third Circuit. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not officially adopted
the majority approach, but two opinions from that court suggest that it
73
would do so if asked whether the FLSA protects internal complaints.
Specifically, the Third Circuit in Brock v. Richardson74 and in Edwards
v. Cornell & Son, Inc.,75 strongly suggested that if confronted with this

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.

71. Id. The court went on to note the similarity between the FLSA's anti-retaliation
provision and the anti-retaliation provision found in the Surface Transportation Assistance
Act (STAA) of 1982, 49 U.S.C. § 31105(a)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. 112008), and concluded that
because the First Circuit had already decided that internal complaints were protected
under the STAA, this provided additional support for the idea that internal complaints
were protected under the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision. Valerio, 173 F.3d at 43-44.
72. Valerio, 173 F.3d at 44. Predictably, many district courts within the First Circuit
have followed Valerio and concluded that internal complaints are protected under the
FLSA. See, e.g., Gosselin v. Boralex Livermore Falls, LP, No. 08-162-P-H, 2009 WL
1421098, at *11 (D. Me. May 19,2009). Similarly, since Kasten, at least one district court
within the First Circuit decided that internal complaints are protected. See Thayer Corp.,
2011 WL 2682723, at *14.
73. See Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1987); Edwards v. A.H. Cornell &
Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010). Now, of course, after Kasten, it is even more
probable that the Third Circuit would adopt the pro-employee approach with respect to this
issue.
74. 812 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1997).
75. 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010).
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issue, it would conclude that internal complaints are protected under the
FLSA.76
In Brock, the court addressed whether an employee was protected
when the employer believed the employee had engaged in one of the acts
listed in the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision, but the employee had not
done so. 7 7 According to the employer, the "mere belief that an
employee had engaged in one of the specified acts was insufficient to
trigger the FLSA's protections.7" The Third Circuit disagreed, noting
that the FLSA was part of a "large body of humanitarian and remedial
legislation," and as such, it should be, and has been, construed
liberally.79 The court cited to both Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v.
Muscoda Local No. 1230 and Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry,
Inc."1 for this broad interpretation, and it noted that other courts have
"looked to [the FLSA's] animating spirit in applying it to activities that
82 Finally, the
might not have been explicitly covered by the language."
court looked at case law broadly interpreting the FLSA's anti-retaliation
provision and at a similar provision in the National Labor Relations Act

76. Brock, 812 F.2d at 124-25; Edwards, 610 F.3d at 224-25.
77. 812 F.2d at 123.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 321 U.S. 590 (1944). Specifically, the court noted the following from Tennessee
Coal:
But these provisions, like the other portions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, are
remedial and humanitarian in purpose. We are not here dealing with mere
chattels or articles of trade but with the rights of those who toil, of those who
sacrifice a full measure of their freedom and talents to the use and profit of others.
Those are the rights that Congress has specially legislated to protect. Such a
statute must not be interpreted or applied in a narrow, grudging manner.
Brock, 812 F.2d at 123-24 (quoting Tennessee Coal, 321 U.S. at 597).
81. 361 U.S. 288 (1960). Specifically, the court noted the following from Mitchell:
For weighty practical and other reasons, Congress did not seek to secure
compliance with prescribed standards through continuing detailed federal
supervision or inspection of payrolls. Rather it chose to rely on information and
complaints received from employees seeking to vindicate rights claimed to have
been denied. Plainly, effective enforcement could thus only be expected if
employees felt free to approach officials with their grievances. This end the
prohibition of§ 15(aX3) against discharges and other discriminatory practices was
designed to serve. For it needs no argument to show that fear of economic
retaliation might often operate to induce aggrieved employees quietly to accept
substandard conditions. By the proscription of retaliatory acts set forth in
§ 15(aX3), and its enforcement in equity by the Secretary pursuant to § 17,
Congress sought to foster a climate in which compliance with the substantive
provisions of the Act would be enhanced.
Brock, 812 F.2d at 124 (citations omitted) (quoting Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292).
82. Brock, 812 F.2d at 124 (emphasis added).

KASTEN

20131

and concluded that "a finding that an employer retaliated against an
employee because the employer believed the employee complained or
engaged in other activity specified in section 15(aX3) is sufficient to
bring the employer's conduct within that section."' Thus, the Third
Circuit took an expansive view of the FLSA despite acknowledging that
the anti-retaliation provision's language might not have covered the
plaintiff's actions."'
Twenty-three years after Brock, the Third Circuit again hinted that it
would hold that the FLSA protects internal complaints.u Although
Edwards involved ERISA,s6 the court suggested that it would adopt a
87
The
broad interpretation of the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision.
to
her
complaining
after
plaintiff in Edwardsalleged she was terminated
whether
was
appeal
on
issue
employer about ERISA violations, and the
Although the
internal complaints were protected under ERISA.
under
protected
not
were
complaints
Third Circuit held that internal
a
reached
have
would
court
the
ERISA, the opinion suggests that
s9
different conclusion under the FLSA.
In an attempt to persuade the court to adopt a broad interpretation of
9°
ERISA's anti-retaliation provision, the plaintiff relied on Brock. The
court noted that Brock involved the FLSA, not ERISA, and it also noted
9
that the Third Circuit had not yet adopted a position on the issue. '
Although not deciding that Brock protected internal complaints, the
court did note that had Brock so held, such a holding would not have
2
applied to the ERISA claim in Edwards. The court acknowledged
that the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision "extends broadly to persons
that have 'filed any complaint,' without explicitly stating the level of
formality required";93 however, because of the differences between the
two anti-retaliation provisions, the pro-employee outcome from Brock

83. Id. at 124-25.
84. Id.
85. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 224-25.
86. ERISA is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
retaliation provision can be found at 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006).
87. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 224-25.

Its anti-

88. Id. at 218.
89. Id. at 224. Although the court ruled against the plaintiff in Edwards, as will be
discussed, infra, the court did address the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision and suggested
that internal complaints would be covered under that provision. Id. at 224-25.

90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 224.
Id.
Id. at 224-25.
Id. at 224.
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does not necessarily extend to ERISA1 4 As a result, the court determined that internal complaints are not covered under ERISA.9"
One district court within the Third Circuit followed that court's
suggestion that the FLSA should be interpreted broadly and concluded
that internal complaints are protected.9" In Chennisi v. Communications Construction Group, LLC, 7 the plaintiff alleged he was terminated after he and his former employer agreed to a settlement that came
about after the plaintiff complained to his employer about overtime.9 8
In its motion to dismiss, the employer relied on the Second Circuit's
opinion in Lambert; however, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected that argument, believing that
the employer's position conflicted "with the view of the FLSA held by the
. . . Third Circuit."99 Although the court acknowledged that the Third
Circuit had not directly addressed this question, the court also acknowledged that the Third Circuit in Brock indicated that the FLSA should be
read broadly. °° Relying on Brock and on the Supreme Court's opinion
in Tennessee Coal, the court stated:
The reasoning for this liberal interpretation is clear. The Third Circuit
has explained that, "[tihe Fair Labor Standards Act is part of the large
body of humanitarian and remedial legislation enacted during the
Great Depression, and has been liberally interpreted." To further the

94. Id. at 224-25. Specifically, ERISA's anti-retaliation section provides the following:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline,
or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to
which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan, this
subchapter, section 1201 of this title, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure
Act[, or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which
such participant may become entitled under the plan, this subchapter, or the
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. It shall be unlawful for any person to
discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or discriminate against any person because he has
given information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or
proceeding relating to this chapter or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure
Act. In the case of a multiemployer plan, it shall be unlawful for the plan sponsor
or any other person to discriminate against any contributing employer for
exercising rights under this chapter or for giving information or testifying in any
inquiry or proceeding relating to this chapter before Congress. The provisions of
section 1132 of this title shall be applicable in the enforcement of this section.
29 U.S.C. § 1140.
95. Edwards, 610 F.3d at 225-26.
96. Chennisi v. Commc'ns Constr. Grp., LLC, No. Civ. A. 04-4826, 2005 WL 387594,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2005).
97. No. 04-4826, 2005 WL 387594 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2005).
98. Id. at *1.
99. Id. at *2.
100. Id.
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humanitarian and remedial purposes of the FLSA, the statute
0 1 must not
be "interpreted or applied in a narrow, grudging manner."

Again quoting Brock, the court noted:
"[C]ourts interpreting the anti-retaliation provision have looked to its
animating spirit in applying it to activities that might not have been
explicitly covered by the language" and held that an employer's mere
belief that an employee has engaged in a protected activity was
02
sufficient to trigger application of [the anti-retaliation provision].
The court continued:
Reading the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA broadly leads us to
conclude that an internal complaint to an employer regarding a
violation of the FLSA is a protected activity under § 215(a)(3). Our
conclusion that making an internal complaint is a protected activity is
necessary to achieve the FLSA's remedial and humanitarian purpose.
Holding otherwise would be contrary to the provision's purpose of
preventing fear of economic retaliation and encouraging employees to
raise concerns about violations of the FLSA.'0 '
As a result, the district court denied the motion to dismiss.'"' Once
again, however, the court focused more on what it believed the purpose
of the FLSA to be rather than on the FLSA's language. 5
3.

The Fifth Circuit's Opinion in Hagan.

The United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also follows the majority rule,
holding that internal complaints are protected under the FLSA.'0 6
Unfortunately for the plaintiff, however, the Fifth Circuit determined

101. Id. (quoting Brock, 812 F.2d at 123-24) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
102. Id. (quoting Brock, 812 F.2d at 124) (emphasis added).
103. Id. (citations omitted).
104. Id. at *3.
105. Many district courts within the Third Circuit have also determined that internal
complaints are protected. See, e.g., Barnello v. AGC Chems. Ams., Inc., No. 2:08-CV-03505
(WJM) (MF), 2009 WL 234142, at *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2009) (pre-Kasten). Predictably, since
Kasten, courts within the Third Circuit have protected internal complaints. See Shakib,
2011 WL 4594654, at *7; Dean, 2011 WL 3734238, at *11; Deeley, 2011 WL 3240828, at *1
n.3.
106. Hagan, 529 F.3d at 626. Prior to Hagan, a district court within the Fifth Circuit
correctly predicted. that the Fifth Circuit would conclude that internal complaints are
protected under the FLSA. Burns v. Blackhawk Mgmt. Corp., 494 F. Supp. 2d 427,432-33
(S.D. Miss. 2007). Although the plaintiff ultimately lost in Burns, the court noted that
most circuits had adopted a broad approach when interpreting the anti-retaliation
provision, and it correctly predicted that the Fifth Circuit "would follow the reasoning of
the vast majority of courts and hold that informal complaints do constitute protected
activity." Id. at 433.
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that he did not adequately voice his concerns or those of others in order
to gain the statute's protection.' 0 ' In Hagan v. Echostar Satellite,
LLC, '° the plaintiff was promoted to a position with supervisory
authority. The plaintiff was told of a change in how the company was
going to schedule its employees-a change that would reduce the amount
of overtime for each employee. The plaintiff did not think the new plan
violated the FLSA, but he did express concern that his employees would
not be happy with the overtime reduction. When he revealed the new
policy to the employees, some of them voiced concern over the policy, and
they also asked whether the new policy was legal. Instead of answering,
the plaintiff instructed the employees to see the Human Resources
Manager. At a subsequent meeting, the employees again asked about
the policy, and the plaintiff informed the employees that the policy
would limit overtime opportunities. Pursuant to instructions he had
received, the plaintiff emphasized that the change was implemented for
efficiency purposes, not to reduce overtime. 1 9
Within one week of these discussions, the plaintiffs employer
terminated him. The plaintiff sued, claiming that the reason for his
termination was his decision to voice concerns over the policy and his
decision to refer his subordinates' questions regarding it to Human
Resources."' The Fifth Circuit framed one of the issues as being
whether the plaintiff's behavior constituted "filing a[ny] complaint"
under the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision."' Noting that the Fifth
Circuit had not yet "addressed the exact contours of [FLSA] protected
activity," the court decided to look at how other courts had resolved this
issue."' The court also noted that the district court took a broad
approach to this phrase's meaning and concluded that "informal, internal
complaint[s] could constitute protected activity under the FLSA."" 3
The Fifth Circuit, however, pointed out that the plaintiff's claim failed
at the district court level because the plaintiffs actions never rose to an
informal complaint because: (1) "there was 'no evidence that [the
plaintiff] at any point crossed the line from acting in his appointed
capacity as a field service manager [on behalf of the company to acting

107. Hagan, 529 F.3d at 626. The United States District Court's opinion can be found
at Hagan v.EchostarSatellite, LLC, No. H-05-1365, 2007 WL 543441 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16,
2007).
108. 529 F.3d 617 (5th Cir. 2008).
109. Id. at 620-21, 626.
110. Id. at 621-23.
111. Id. at 625.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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in an adversarial role against [the company]'"; and (2) the plaintiff
4
lacked a good faith belief that the company violated the FLSA."
The Fifth Circuit then addressed whether internal complaints were
protected under the FLSA." 5 Without much analysis of the statutory
language, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the lower court and noted that
it would "adopt the majority rule, which allows an informal, internal
complaint to constitute protected activity under Section 215(a)(3),
because it better captures the anti-retaliationgoals of that section." 6
Thus, this is another example of a court failing to perform a thorough
analysis of the FLSA's language, but rather focusing on what it believed
to be the anti-retaliation provision's purpose." 7 The court devoted the
rest of its opinion to deciding whether the plaintiff's actions rose to
"informal complaints" and concluded that they did not." 8 The court
noted that the plaintiffs decision to express his concern that the
employees might receive less overtime and his decision to refer the
questions to Human Resources did not constitute informal complaints
9
The court therefore
sufficient to trigger the FLSA's protection."
120
judgment.
affirmed the district court's
The Sixth Circuit's Opinion in Romeo Community
4.
Schools. Another court that adopted the majority approach without
much analysis is the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.' 2 ' That court was faced with a claim under the Equal Pay Act

(EPA), which shares the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision.

22

In EEOC

114. Id. (quoting Hagan, 2007 WL 543441, at *5).
115. Id. at 625-27.
116. Id. at 626 (emphasis added). The only other "analysis" in which the court partook
was when it noted that "[slection 215(aX3) speaks of an employee 'fil[ing] any complaint,'
and we cannot agree that the plain language is limited to filing a formal complaint." Id.
(alteration in original).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 626-30.
119. Id. at 626.
120. Id. at 630. Predictably, many district courts within the Fifth Circuit have also
concluded that internal complaints are protected. See, e.g., Eyles v. Uline, Inc., No. 4:08CV-577-A, 2009 WL 2868447, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2009), affd, 381 F. App'x 384 (5th
Cir. 2010) (pre-Kasten). Since Kasten, this has continued. See, e.g., Coberly v. Christus
Health, No. 3:10-CV-1213-L, 829 F. Supp. 2d 521, 526 (N.D. Tex. 2011), and Palmer,2011
WL 1230206. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit recently relied on Kasten to support the
proposition that an oral, internal complaint was protected activity. See Maynor v. Dow
Chem. Co., 430 F. App'x 313, 313 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2011).
121. See EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d 985 (6th Cir. 1992).
122. The substantive provision of the Equal Pay Act can be found at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(2006). The FLSA's anti-retaliation provision applies to the Equal Pay Act. See, e.g.,
Lambert, 10 F.3d at 55.

476

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

v. Romeo Community Schools,123 a female employee alleged she was
paid less than her male counterparts and that she experienced an
adverse employment action for complaining to management about this
issue." 4 After addressing the substantive EPA claim, the court
addressed the retaliation claim.'25 The lower court had rejected this
claim, holding that any complaints made prior to a filing with the EEOC
1 26

were not protected.

The Sixth Circuit concluded that the lower court's decision was clearly
erroneous.' 27 The court relied on precedent from other jurisdictions and
did not provide much analysis. 128 The court relied on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Love v. RE/MAX of
America, Inc.,129 for the propositions that "'Itihe Act also applies to the
unofficial assertion [of] rights through complaints at work'" and that "it
is the assertion of statutory rights which is the triggering factor, not the
filing of a formal complaint." 30 The court, therefore, adopted a broad
interpretation of the FLSA without much analysis of the statute's
language. 131

Judge Suhrheinrich dissented in part and concurred in part. 32 He
believed the plaintiff's retaliation claim should have failed because the
FLSA's language only protects employees who engage in the specific
activities listed in the statute.131 Judge Suhrheinrich believed that
because the employer terminated the plaintiff before she engaged in any
of those activities, the plaintiff could not have been retaliated against for
engaging in any of those activities."
He then noted that had this
retaliation claim been brought under Title VII, which has a much
broader anti-retaliation provision, he might have agreed with the
outcome; however, because the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision is not

123. 976 F.2d 985 (6th Cir. 1992).
124. Id. at 987.
125. Id. at 989.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 738 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1984).
130. Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d at 989 (alteration in original) (quoting Love, 738 F.2d
at 387).
131. Id. at 989-90. The Sixth Circuit has reaffirmed its view that internal complaints
are protected under the FLSA. See Moore v. Freeman, 355 F.3d 558, 562 (6th Cir. 2004);
Cunningham v. Gibson Cnty., No. 95-6667, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. Mar. 18, 1997).
132. Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d at 990 (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).

133. Id.
134. Id.
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135 This
as broad as Title VII's, he could not agree with the majority.
opinion, which actually looked at the FLSA's language, was certainly the
minority view, and unfortunately for employers, the Court's opinion in
made this opinion from Judge Suhrheinrich
Kasten has most likely
13

almost meaningless.

1

5. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion in Ackerly. Not surprisingly, the
usually pro-plaintiff United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit decided that the FLSA protects internal complaints. 137 In
Lambert v. Ackerly, 131 the plaintiffs, who had complained to their
employer about overtime wages, won a multi-million-dollar judgment,
and the defendants appealed the denial of their motion for judgment as
a matter of law. 139 Initially, the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the
defendants, but the court agreed to hear the case en banc.140 The
Ninth Circuit then affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding
that the1 FLSA's anti-retaliation provision covers internal complaints.

14

The court phrased the issue as "whether the FLSA's prohibition on
terminating an employee who has 'filed any complaint or instituted or
caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter'
protects an employee who complains to his employer about violations of
the Act." 42 The court noted that this was an issue of first impression
for that court, but that seven circuits had already held that the FLSA
does cover internal complaints. 14 3 The court also noted that the Second

135. Id.
136. Although the Court in Kasten maintained that it was not answering the question
of whether internal complaints were protected, as Justice Scalia pointed out, the Court's
opinion essentially presumed that internal complaints were, in fact, protected. 131 S.Ct.
at 1341 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Specifically, as will be discussed infra, the Court in Kasten
established a test for determining what constitutes protected activity-a test which would
See infra sections
only make sense if internal complaints were, in fact, protected.
IV(A)&(B).
137. Lambert v. Ackerly, 180 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999).
138. 180 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999).
139. Id. at 1002.
140. Id. The Ninth Circuit's initial panel opinion can be found at 156 F.3d 1018 (9th
Cir. 1998).
141. Ackerly, 180 F.3d at 1002, 1004.
142. Id. at 1003.
143. Id. The court cited the following cases for the majority position: Valerio v. Putnam
Assocs. Inc., 173 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 1999); Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1987);
EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d 985 (6th Cir. 1992); Brennan v. Maxey's Yamaha,
Inc., 513 F.2d 179 (8th Cir. 1975); Love v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383 (10th Cir.
1984); and EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006 (lth Cir. 1989). Ackerly, 180
F.3d at 1003.
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Second Circuit was the only court to reach the opposite conclusion.'"
Relying on Tennessee Coal and Mitchell, the court then stated that
remedial statutes must be construed broadly, and it noted that:
[The FLSA is] remedial and humanitarian in purpose. We are not here
dealing with mere chattels or articles of trade but with the rights of
those who toil .... Those are rights that Congress has specifically
legislated to protect. Such a statute must not be interpretedor applied
in a narrow, grudging manner.4 .
Thus, by relying on Supreme Court precedent that focused on policy
rather than on statutory language, the Ninth Circuit, like several other
courts, relied on what it believed to be the policy behind the FLSA
rather than on its language. Then, relying on Mitchell, the Ninth
Circuit emphasized that the FLSA should "provide an incentive for
employees to report wage and hour violations by their employers."'46
Again quoting the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit observed:
For weighty practical and other reasons, Congress did not seek to
secure compliance with prescribed standards through continuing
detailed federal supervision or inspection of payrolls. Rather it chose
to rely on information and complaints received from employees seeking
to vindicate rights claimed to have been denied ....[It needs no
argument to show that fear of economic retaliation might often operate
to induce aggrieved employees quietly to accept substandard conditions.'4 7

The Ninth Circuit then quoted cases from the Third, Eleventh, and
First Circuits. 48 First, the court quoted Brock: "'the [Supreme] Court
has made clear that the key to interpreting the [FLSA's] anti-retaliation
provision is the need to prevent employees' "fear of economic retaliation"
for voicing grievancess about substandard conditions." ' 149 Next, the
court relied on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
6 °
Circuit's opinion in EEOC v. White & Son Enterprises
for the idea
that "'[tihe anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA was designed to

144. Ackerly, 180 F.3d at 1003. At the time of the opinion, the Fourth Circuit had not
yet issued its decision in Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2000). See
infra section III(B).
145. Ackerly, 180 F.3d at 1003 (alteration in original) (quoting Tennessee Coal, 321 U.S.
at 597).

146. Id.
147. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292).
148. Id. at 1003-04. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit cited Valerio, 173 F.3d 35; Brock,
812 F.2d 121; and White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006. Ackerly, 180 F.3d at 1003-04.
149. Ackerly, 180 F.3d at 1003 (alteration in original) (quoting Brock, 812 F.2d at 124).
150. 881 F.2d 1006 (11th Cir. 1989).
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prevent fear of economic retaliation by an employer against an employee
.,,
"'1 The court continued:
who chose to voice such a grievance
provision to
anti-retaliation
to
the
"'[bly giving a broad construction
include [informal complaints made to employers], its purpose will be
further promoted.' 152 Finally, the court quoted Valerio:
A narrow construction of the anti-retaliation provision could create an
atmosphere of intimidation and defeat the Act's purpose in § 215(a)(3)
of preventing employees' attempts to secure their rights under the Act
from taking on the character of"a calculated risk." Such circumstances
would fail to "foster a climate in which compliance with the substantive
provisions of the Act would be enhanced." Hence we, like many of our
sister circuits, conclude that the animating spirit of the Act is best
served by a construction of § 215(a)(3) under which the filing of a
relevant complaint with the employer no less than with a court or
agency may give rise to a retaliation claim. 5 '
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit decided to protect employees who lodge
internal complaints. 5 4 The Ninth Circuit concluded that this interpretation provided the most protection to employees and furthered what it
believed to be the FLSA's purpose. 5' The court then held the following:
We hold, therefore, that in order for the anti-retaliation provision to
ensure that "fear of economic retaliation" not "operate to induce
aggrieved employees quietly to accept substandard conditions," [the
anti-retaliation provision] must protect employees who complain about
violations to their employers, as well as employees who turn to the
Labor Department or the courts for a remedy.'56
Only after looking at other courts' interpretations of the statute did
the Ninth Circuit analyze the FLSA's language. 5 ' After doing so, the
court decided that its interpretation was consistent with that language. 158 First, the court concluded that the phrase "any complaint"
meant any complaint, whether made to an employer or to a court or
agency.'59 Second, the court noted that the word file could include

151.
F.2d at
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Ackerly, 180 F.3d at 1004 (alteration in original) (quoting White & Son Enters., 881
1011).
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d at 1011).
Id. (quoting Valerio, 173 F.3d at 43).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292).
Id. at 1004-05.
Id. at 1004.
Id.
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complaints made to employers. 6 ° Finally, the court concluded that the
phrase "related to," when used in the phrase "under or related to this
chapter," could refer to internal complaints.' 6 ' Therefore, and to its
credit, the Ninth Circuit looked at the FLSA's language and concluded
that it was consistent with what it determined to be the FLSA's
purpose.162 The court, therefore, granted protection to employees who
lodged internal complaints.' 3
Next, after rejecting the Second Circuit's opinion in Lambert, the
Ninth Circuit pointed to several other anti-retaliation provisions and
how various courts had interpreted them to provide protection to
employees who complained to their employers.'
After doing this, the
Ninth Circuit concluded: "[b]y holding that the anti-retaliation provision
of the FLSA similarly extends protection to employees who complain of
alleged violations to their employers, we follow a course well tread both
by our court and the other circuits."'65 Thus, although the Ninth
Circuit first looked at what it determined to be the policy behind the
FLSA, it eventually looked at the statute's language to reach its proemployee conclusion.'6 6
6. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion in Love. The Tenth Circuit is
another jurisdiction where internal complaints are protected under the
FLSA. 167 Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has not directly faced this question, by ruling in favor of the
plaintiff in Love, it implicitly endorsed the majority approach. 6 1 In
Love, upon learning that male employees were receiving higher pay than

160. Id.
161. Id. at 1004-05.

162. Id.
163. Id. at 1005.
164. Id. at 1005-07. The statutes to which the court compared the FLSA included the
Federal Mine Health and Safety Act, the Federal Railroad Safety Act, and the Clean Water
Act.
165. Id. at 1007. Since this opinion, the Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed its belief that the
FLSA's anti-retaliation provision covers internal complaints. See Majewski v. St. Rose
Dominican Hosp., 310 F.3d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that anti-retaliation provisions
must be construed broadly, and specifically referring to its opinion in Ackerly). See also
Williamson v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 208 F.3d 1144, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000).
166. Ackerly, 180 F.3d at 1004-05. Predictably, several district courts within the Ninth
Circuit have also concluded that internal complaints are covered under the FLSA. See, e.g.,
Campbell-Thomson v. Cox Commc'ns, No. CV-08-1656-PHX-GMS, 2010 WL 1814844, at *5
(D. Ariz. May 5,2010); Tumulty v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. C04-1425P, 2005

WL 1979104, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 16, 2005).
167. Love, 738 F.2d at 387.
168. Id.
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she was, the plaintiff sent a memorandum to the company president,
requesting a raise. She also attached a copy of the Equal Pay Act.
Within two hours of sending this memorandum, the plaintiff was
terminated. She sued under the EPA and Title VII, alleging violations
of the substantive prohibitions of the acts and retaliation. The trial
court found that the employer did not discriminate against the plaintiff,
but it did conclude that the plaintiff proved that she was the victim of
under which statute the
retaliation. The lower court did not specify
69
plaintiff proved her retaliation claim(s).
On appeal, the defendant argued that because the plaintiff was
unsuccessful on her substantive claims, she could not prevail on her
retaliation claim(s).17 ° The Tenth Circuit focused most of its opinion
on the issue of whether a plaintiff must win the underlying Title VII
claim in order to win a retaliation claim, but it eventually addressed the
EPA/FLSA retaliation issue.'7 1 The court quoted the FLSA's antiretaliation provision's language and noted that "Congress 'sought to
foster a climate in which compliance with the substantive provisions of
the Act would be enhanced' by recognizing that 'fear of economic
retaliation might often operate to induce aggrieved employees quietly to
accept substandard conditions.'"' 172 The court then, without much
analysis of the provision's language, noted that the anti-retaliation
provision "also applies to the unofficial assertion of rights through
complaints at work. " 173 As a result, the court affirmed the district
court's judgment on the plaintiff's retaliation claim(s).17 Thus, this
case is another example of a court focusing more on policy than on the
statute's language.
7. The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in White & Son Enterprises. Another United States Court of Appeals that took a pro-employee
175
view of the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision is the Eleventh Circuit.
Although it did so over twenty years ago, that court's decision in White
& Son Enterprises was recently cited with approval in Keeler v. Florida
Department of Health.76 In White & Son Enterprises,the EEOC sued

169. Id. at 384-85.
170. Id. at 385.
171. Id. at 387.
172. Id. (quoting Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292).
173. Id.
174. Id. Several years after Love, the Tenth Circuit re-affirmed its position that
internal complaints are protected under the FLSA. Pacheco v. Whiting Farms, Inc., 365
F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2004).
175. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d at 1011.
176. 324 F. App'x 850, 858 (11th Cir. 2009).
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on behalf of several plaintiffs, alleging that the employer violated both
the EPA and Title VII, and alleging that the employer retaliated against
employees for protesting the unequal treatment they received. 7 The
court first addressed the substantive EPA and Title VII claims, and it
ultimately concluded that the female employees were victims of
discrimination.' 7
The court then addressed the retaliation claims.'79 One argument
the employer made was that the employees "had not filed a complaint,
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding, testified, or served
on an industry committee and were not about to testify in a proceeding
or serve on an industry committee." i"' The employer argued that
because of this, the employees had not engaged in protected activity.'"'
Rejecting this argument, the Eleventh Circuit decided that the complaints made to at2 least two people within the company constituted
8
protected activity.

Despite noting that the "charging parties did not perform an act that
is explicitly listed in the FLSA's anti-retaliationprovision... ," the court
concluded that "the unofficial complaints expressed by the women to
their employer about unequal pay constitute an assertion of rights
protected under the statute.""s3 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that internal complaints were not explicitly covered by the FLSA;
nonetheless, relying on Tennessee Coal and Mitchell, the court noted that
the FLSA should be interpreted broadly." 4 The court continued
"Congress sought to secure compliance with the substantive provisions
of the labor statute by having 'employees seeking to vindicate rights
claimed to have been denied' lodge complaints or supply information to
officials regarding allegedly substandard employment practices and
conditions."8 5 Finally, the court noted that the FLSA's anti-retaliation
provision "was designed to prevent fear of economic retaliation by an
employer against an employee" who chose to express FLSA-related
concerns, and that "[bly giving a broad construction to the antiretaliation provision to include the form of protest engaged in... by the
charging parties, its purpose will be further promoted. " 1

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

881 F.2d at 1007.
Id. at 1010.
Id.
Id. at 1011; see also 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d at 1011.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (quoting Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292).
Id.

6

Thus, in
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reaching its decision, the court focused less on the statute's language
and more on what it believed the statute's purpose to be.1" 7 This is
how most courts that took a pro-employee interpretation of the FLSA
reached that conclusion.
8. The Approach Taken Within the District of Columbia
Circuit. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has not directly answered whether internal FLSA
complaints constitute protected activity. The district court within that
jurisdiction has, however, decided that internal complaints are protected."s In Mansfield v. Billington, s9 the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia reconsidered a ruling that dismissed the
plaintiff's claim that her employer violated the FLSA when it terminated
her for complaining to her supervisor regarding her pay."' In initially
dismissing that claim, the lower court relied on Ball v. Memphis Bar-BQ Co.19' and Lambert to conclude that the FLSA's anti-retaliation
provision does not cover internal complaints.'92 Specifically, in the
initial opinion, the court observed:
The plain language of the EPA's retaliation provision expressly limits
the scope of its application. It discusses the filing of "any complaint"
in the context of formal legal actions, such as instituting proceedings,
testifying, and serving on an industry committee. By way of contrast,
Title VII protects employees who have "opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter." The phrase
"opposed any practice" is markedly more inclusive than the language
of the EPA's anti-retaliation provision which protects the filing of "any
complaint" in the context of specific formal actions. 93
The court initially dismissed the plaintiff's claim because she had not
filed a formal complaint. Despite this ruling, the plaintiff argued that
because the Supreme Court issued three opinions following the dismissal

187. See id. In fact, as noted in the text above, when the court did address the
statutory language, it acknowledged that internal complaints were not explicitly covered.
Id. Predictably, district courts within the Eleventh Circuit have also concluded that
internal complaints are covered under the FLSA. See, e.g., Ramos v. Collins & 74th St.,
Inc., No. 07-21478-CIV, 2008 WL 2804705 (S.D. Fla. July 21, 2008).
188. Mansfield v. Billington, 669 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15 (D.D.C. 2009).
189. 669 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2009).
190. Id. at 12. The plaintiff also sought relief under the substantive provisions of Title
VII and the EPA as well as under Title VII's anti-retaliation provision. Id.
191. 228 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2000).
192. Mansfield, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 14.
193. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Memorandum Opinion at
14 (June 1, 2006)).
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of her retaliation complaint, all of which supported an expansive view of
federal anti-retaliation provisions, the court should reconsider its initial
decision."9 The employer correctly pointed out that not one of those
Supreme Court opinions addressed the EPA or the FLSA, but the court
nonetheless agreed with the plaintiff. 9 ' The three cases upon which
the plaintiff relied were Gomez-Perez v. Potter,9 ' CBOCS West, Inc. v.
Humphries,'97 and Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.
White. 98 In Gomez-Perez, the Court determined that the ADEA
prohibits retaliation against federal employees even though there is no
federal-sector anti-retaliation provision within the ADEA. 9
In
CBOCS West, the Court determined that despite no express prohibition
against retaliation, 42 U.S.C. § 1981200 provided such a cause of
action.20 ' Finally, in Burlington Northern, the Court determined that
Title VII's anti-retaliation provision extended beyond employmentrelated acts of retaliation.2 2 These opinions led the court in Mansfield
to note that "[t]hese particularly expansive readings of federal employment discrimination statutes persuade the court that the Supreme Court
favors an increasingly broad interpretation of statutes containing antiretaliation provisions. " " The court continued: "[a]ccordingly, in light
of these recent decisions, the court grants the plaintiff's motion for relief
upon reconsideration."2 4
Thus, although the court in Mansfield correctly anticipated the broad
interpretation the Court would soon be giving the FLSA in Kasten, it
ruled in favor of the plaintiff without engaging in a thorough analysis
of the FLSA's language.20 5

194. Id. at 12, 14.
195. Id. at 14-15.
196. 553 U.S. 474 (2008).
197. 553 U.S. 442 (2008).
198. 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
199. 553 U.S. at 477.
200. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
201. 553 U.S. at 445.
202. 548 U.S. at 67.
203. 669 F. Supp. 2d at 15. Since the Court's opinions in those cases, the Court has
also issued pro-employee interpretations of Title VI's anti-retaliation provision in two
other cases. Specifically, in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 555 U.S.
271, 273 (2009), the Court decided that statements made during an internal investigation
are protected under Title VIis anti-retaliation provision, and in Thompson v. North
American Stainless,LP, 131 S. Ct. 863,868 (2011), the Court decided that Title VIi's antiretaliation provision protects against third-party retaliation.
204. Mansfield, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 15.
205. Id. at 15-16.
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The Minority Approach: Internal Complaints Are Not Protected
Most courts have concluded that a broad interpretation of the FLSA's
anti-retaliation provision is more appropriate than a narrow one. 206
Nonetheless, prior to Kasten, two circuits had taken the opposite
approach.207 Whether Kasten will make these opinions obsolete is now
a legitimate question."' The Court's opinion in Kasten, along with the
dissenting opinion, will be addressed later in this Article. 20 9 First,
however, it is appropriate to discuss the Second Circuit's opinion in
Lambert and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's
opinion in Ball.

B.

1. The Second Circuit's Opinion in Lambert. The Second
Circuit's opinion in Lambert is often cited for the proposition that the
210
FLSA's anti-retaliation provision does not cover internal complaints.
In Lambert, the plaintiffs sued their employer, alleging violations of Title
VII, the EPA, and state law.211 There were several issues on appeal,
and the Second Circuit addressed those issues before addressing whether
the FLSA protects internal complaints.212 Interestingly, that issue was
not brought before the district court, and the district court assumed that
internal complaints were protected.213 Nonetheless, the Second Circuit
observed that it had the discretion to decide "sua sponte a dispositive
issue of law that, taking a plaintiff's 2factual
allegations to be true, would
14
prevent a plaintiff from recovering."

The court started by comparing Title VII's anti-retaliation provision
with the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision and correctly noted that based
on its opposition clause, Title VII's anti-retaliation provision covered
internal complaints, regardless of whether the employee filed an EEOC

206.

See supra section I1(A).

207. See Lambert, 10 F.3d at 55; Ball, 228 F.3d at 364. Predictably, prior to Kasten,
district courts within the Second and Fourth Circuits followed this approach. See, e.g.,
Rizzo v. Kraus Org., No. 10-CV-272 (JG) (RER), 2010 WL 2427434 (E.D.N.Y. May 25,
2010); Boateng v. Terminex Int'l Co., No. 07-617, 2007 WL 2572403 (E.D. Va. Sept. 4,

2007).
208. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia strongly suggests the majority opinion in
Kasten will have that effect. Kasten, 131 S.Ct. at 1341 (Scalia, J., dissenting); but see Flick
v. Am. Fin. Res., Inc., CV 10-3081, 2012 WL 5386157 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2012).
209. See infra section IV.
210. See, e.g., Ritchie v. St. Louis Jewish Light, No. 4:09-CV-1947 CAS, 2010 WL
502946, at *3 n.2 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2010), affd, 630 F.3d 713 (8th Cir. 2011).
211. 10 F.3d at 50.
212. Id. at 52-53.
213. Id. at 56.
214. Id.
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charge. 15 The court then contrasted that language with the FLSA,
which does not have an "opposition clause," and it determined that the
FLSA "limits the cause of action to retaliation for filing formal complaints, instituting a proceeding, or testifying, but does not encompass
complaints made to a supervisor."216 The court noted that its interpretation conflicted with opinions from several circuit courts of appeals, and
it also noted that it would not defer to the EEOC's position that the
FLSA covers internal complaints. 2 17

The court determined that

because the plaintiffs did not file an external complaint prior to the
retaliation, the plaintiffs did not have a cause of action under the EPA's
anti-retaliation provision. 1
Thus, its analysis of the FLSA focused
predominantly on the difference between Title VII's language and the
FLSA's language, and it concluded that the FLSA did not cover internal
complaints. 19 Thus, unlike the courts that found that the FLSA does
cover internal complaints, the Second Circuit, which focused on the
statutory language, reached the opposite conclusion.22 °
2. The Fourth Circuit's Opinion in Ball. The Second Circuit is
not the only circuit with a narrow view of the FLSA's anti-retaliation
provision. The other United States Court of Appeals to adopt a narrow
interpretation of the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision is the Fourth
Circuit. 22 1

Although the question of whether internal complaints

constitute protected activity was not directly before the Fourth Circuit
in Ball, many courts have interpreted Ball to stand for the proposition
that such FLSA complaints are not protected.222

215. Id. at 55.
216. Id. (citing Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d at 990 (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 55-56. In reaching its conclusion, the court also distinguished Brock v.
Casey Truck Sales, Inc., 839 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1988), and claimed that although the
plaintiffs prevailed in that case, the facts of that case were "easily distinguishable."
Lambert, 10 F.3d at 55.
220. Lambert, 10 F.3d at 55. Predictably, prior to Kasten, district courts within the
Second Circuit decided that internal complaints were not protected under the FLSA. See,
e.g., Higueros v. N.Y. State Catholic Health Plan, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 2d 342, 345-46
(E.D.N.Y. 2007). Since Kasten, some courts have continued to deny protection for internal
complaints. See, e.g., Flick, 2012 WL 5386157.
221. Ball, 228 F.3d at 364.
222. See, e.g., Rizzo, 2010 WL 2427434, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 25, 2010). As noted above,
the issue in Ball was not the difference between internal and external complaints. In fact,
although many courts cite Ball for the proposition that internal complaints are not
protected, the court suggested in a footnote that internal complaints might be protected
under the FLSA. 228 F.3d at 363 n.*. Since the time this Article was written, the Fourth
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In Ball, the plaintiff sued his former employer, alleging that he was
terminated for not being willing to testify the way the company
president wanted him to testify in another employee's potential FLSA
lawsuit. Once the plaintiff learned of the potential lawsuit, he told the
company president, and that is when the two disagreed over how the
plaintiff would testify. According to the plaintiff, it was this dispute that
led to his termination.2 23 The question before the court was whether
there was a "proceeding" prior to the filing of the other employee's
lawsuit; if there was a proceeding, the plaintiff would have been "about
to testify"; if there was not a proceeding, the plaintiff would not have
been "about to testify" and would not have been protected by the
FLSA.224 Importantly, the court noted that this case hinged on the
provision's "testimony clause" rather than on its
FLSA's anti-retaliation
"complaint clause." 225
While the plaintiff and the Secretary of Labor urged the court to adopt
a broad interpretation of the FLSA when addressing whether the
plaintiff was "'discharge[d] . .. because [he was] about to testify in any
226
After restating several
... proceeding,"' the court rejected that idea.
statements regarding the FLSA's broad remedial purpose (and thus
leading a reader to believe the court was going to rule in the plaintiff's
favor), the Fourth Circuit then stated that despite the need to interpret
this type of statute broadly, "the statutory language clearly places limits
on the range of retaliation proscribed by the Act."227 It then compared
the FLSA with Title VII and observed that Title VII's anti-retaliation
The court then addressed
provision provided more protection. 22"
whether an as-of-yet-unfiled lawsuit constituted an FLSA "proceeding."229 The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that a proceeding
begins once an employee makes an internal complaint, noting that the
term proceeding "is modified by attributes of administrative or court

Circuit has affirmatively held that internal complaints are protected under the FLSA_
Minor v. Bostwick Labs., Inc., 669 F.3d 428 (4th Cir. 2012). Also, while the Fourth Circuit
has decided to protect internal complaints, some of the arguments made by district courts
within the Fourth Circuit before Minor, although now not particularly relevant within the
Fourth Circuit, still provide strong analysis why internal complaints should not be covered.
See infra Section V.B.
223. Ball, 228 F.3d at 362.
224. Id. at 363; see also 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
225. Ball, 228 F.3d at 363 n.*.
226. Id. at 363, 365 (alteration in original); see also 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
227. Ball, 228 F.3d at 363-64.
228. Id. at 364.
229. Id. at 363-65.
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proceedings."3 0 Specifically, a proceeding must be "instituted," and it
also requires "testimony." 3 ' The court then noted that the term
instituted "connotes a formality that does not attend an employee's oral
complaint to a supervisor." 2 Importantly, the court noted:
Testimony amounts to statements given under oath or affirmation. By
referring to a proceeding that has been "instituted" and in which
"testimony" can be given, Congress signaled its intent to proscribe
retaliatory employment actions taken after formal proceedings have
begun, but not in the context of a complaint made by an employee to
a supervisor about a violation of the FLSA.'
Although the court believed the employer's conduct was "morally
unacceptable," it determined that it was bound by the FLSA's language,
which required that a proceeding in either an administrative or judicial
forum be started before an employee can claim FLSA protection. 2"
Although this case did not specifically address the issue of whether the
FLSA protects internal complaints, it has been cited very often for the
proposition that internal complaints are not protected. 235

C.

Uncertainty Within the Eighth Circuit

While most courts of appeals have decided whether the FLSA protects
internal complaints, there is some confusion about this issue within the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. While some
courts have read the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Brennan v. Maxey's
Yamaha, Inc.236 as protecting internal complaints, 7 the Eighth
230. Id. at 364.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
234. Id. See also Whitten v. City of Easley, 62 F. App'x 477, 480 (4th Cir. 2003) (per
curiam) (noting that the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision does not cover internal
complaints). District courts within the Fourth Circuit have also followed this approach.
See, e.g., Bell-Holcombe v. Ki, LLC, 582 F. Supp. 2d 761, 763 (E.D. Va. 2008); ONeill v.
Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 956 F. Supp. 661, 664 (E.D. Va. 1997). Of course, now that the
Fourth Circuit has decided Minor, the district court opinions within the Fourth Circuit that
reached a pro-employer outcome on this issue are no longer good law within the Fourth
Circuit. That does not, however, diminish the soundness of those courts' arguments
regarding why internal complaints should not be protected.
235. See, e.g., Ritchie, 2010 WL 502946, at *3 n.2. District courts within the Fourth
Circuit have also relied on Ball for the proposition that the FLSA does not cover internal
complaints. See, e.g., Blevins v. Suarez, No. 4:08CV00014, 2008 WL 4560627, at *6 (W.D.
Va. Oct. 10, 2008), affd, 322 F. App'x 284 (4th Cir. 2009).
236. 513 F.2d 179 (8th Cir. 1975).
237. E.g., Casey v. Livingston Parish Commc'ns Dist., No. 07-30990, 2009 WL 577756,
at *5 (5th Cir. Mar. 6, 2009) (per curiam); Ackerly, 180 F.3d at 1003; Valerio, 173 F.3d at
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Circuit has not directly addressed this issue, and this has led district
5
courts within the Eighth Circuit to reach different conclusions." In
Brennan, the Department of Labor conducted an investigation of the
defendant and determined that the defendant owed back wages to many
employees. The employer agreed to pay the wages, but it instructed
239
some of the employees to sign their checks back to the company.
One of the employees refused to do so and engaged in what the court
described as an "outburst"; the company conceded that prior to this
Eventually, the court
outburst, it had no plans of terminating her.'
addressed the scope of protected activity under the FLSA. 2" The court
noted:
[The plaintiff's] protest of what she believed to be unlawful conduct on
[the defendant's] part was an act protected from reprisals and rendered
her firing discriminatory regardless of the existence of other grounds
for her discharge . .

.

. To hold otherwise would defeat the Act's

purpose in [§] 215(a)(3) of preventing employees' attempts to secure
under the Act from taking on the character of "a calculated
their" rights
242
risk.

Therefore, although the Eighth Circuit was not directly confronted
with the issue, the court, focusing on what it believed to be the FLSA's
anti-retaliation provision's purpose, implied that internal complaints
were protected. 24'3 Several courts have interpreted this case as reaching that conclusion;2' however, other courts within the Eighth Circuit
are not as convinced that Brennan stands for this proposition."45
One recent opinion from within the Eighth Circuit that reached a proemployer outcome is Ritchie v. Saint Louis Jewish Light.2' In Ritchie,
41; and Love, 738 F.2d at 387.
238. CompareJackson v. Advantage Commc'ns, Inc., No. 4:08CV00353 SWW, 2009 WL
2508210, at *6 n.5 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 14, 2009) (distinguishing Brennan and concluding that
intra-company complaints are not protected activity under the FLSA), with Wolfe v. Clear
Title, LLC, 654 F. Supp. 2d 929, 934 (E.D. Ark. 2009) (concluding that Brennan required
the district court to recognize intra-company complaints as protected activity). Since the
time this Article was written, the Eighth Circuit decided Montgomery v. Havner, 700 F.3d
1146 (8th Cir. 2012), in which the court assumed, but did not decide, that internal
complaints are protected.
239. Brennan, 513 F.2d at 180.
240. Id. at 180-81.
241. Id. at 181.
242. Id. (quoting Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 293).
243. See id.

244. See supra note 238.
245. See supra note 238.
246. No. 4:09-CV-1947 CAS, 2010 WL 502946 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2010), affd, 630 F.3d
713 (8th Cir. 2011).
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the plaintiff and her employer were involved in a dispute regarding
overtime, and the employee, who was eventually terminated, claimed
that her termination was the result of her decision to continue to record
her overtime. 7
The plaintiff sued, and the employer moved to
dismiss.1 8 After noting that the Supreme Court and various other
courts had interpreted the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision broadly, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri noted
that, "[on its face," the statute only protected individuals who file
complaints, institute proceedings, testify in proceedings, and serve on
industry committees. 9
The employer argued that because the
plaintiff had not engaged in any of these activities, her actions were not
protected.2 5 0 Relying on Brennan and Grey v. City of Oak Grove,
Missouri,2 5 ' (where the court concluded that the plaintiff engaged in
protected activity even though there was no indication of a formal
complaint), the plaintiff argued that her conduct was protected.25 2
The Ritchie court acknowledged the circuit split, and it also noted that
the Eighth Circuit had not directly addressed this issue.253 In addressing Brennan, the Ritchie court noted that the Secretary of Labor had
already become involved with the case, and it also noted that the critical
issue in that case was the employer's motive in terminating the
plaintiff.2 ' The court then observed that in a case factually similar
to the one before it, 25 5 another district judge distinguished Brennan by
noting that because the Department of Labor had already become
involved in the dispute, there was a "proceeding" under which the
plaintiff's actions were covered.256 The court in Ritchie then held that
the statutory language did not cover internal complaints. 7 The court
cited district court opinions from within the Eighth Circuit that

247. Id. at *1. This behavior does not constitute an oral or written complaint, but
rather is one way of showing opposition to what the employee believed was an unlawful
practice. Nonetheless, in its opinion, the court referred to this action as an oral complaint.
Id. at *5.
248. Id. at *1.
249. Id. at *2.
250. Id.
251. 396 F.3d 1031, 1035 (8th Cir. 2005).
252. Ritchie, 2010 WL 502946, at *2.
253. Id. at *3.
254. Id.
255. Bartis v. John Bommarito Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 2d 994 (E.D. Mo.
2009).
256. Ritchie, 2010 WL 502946, at *3 (citing Bartis, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 999).
257. Id. at *5.
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supported this conclusion. 8 The court then addressed the other
25
Eighth Circuit opinion on which the plaintiff relied, but it decided
that because the Eighth Circuit did not directly address whether the
FLSA covers internal complaints, the court in Ritchie was not bound to
follow that decision.26 °
In the last paragraph of Ritchie, the court conceded that the plaintiff's
position was supported by the majority of courts and that her position
"arguably draws some support from language in the Eighth Circuit's
Brennan and Grey decisions."26 ' Nonetheless, the court concluded that
the plaintiffs actions were not covered:
This is because the statute's plain language requires a plaintiff to file
a complaint, institute a proceeding, testify in any such proceeding, or
serve on an industry committee, and plaintiff did none of those things.
Further, there is no formal proceeding in place, nor did plaintiff make
a written demand or complaint of any sort, to bring herself within the
2 2
circumstances present in the Brennan and Grey decisions. "

This approach has not been followed by all courts within the Eighth
Circuit.

26 3
the United
For example, in Wolfe v. Clear Title, LLC,

States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas faced three
issues: (1) whether the plaintiff was an exempt employee; (2) whether
the statute of limitations barred the plaintiff's claims; and (3) whether
punitive damages were available. 2 4 After addressing the first two
issues, the court addressed the scope of the FLSA's anti-retaliation
provision.26 The court noted that most courts have protected internal
complaints, and it then relied on Brennan for the proposition that the
FLSA's anti-retaliation provision prohibits retaliation against "an
26 6
employee who asserts or [who] threatens to assert FLSA rights."
Although the court acknowledged that Brennan had been criticized, it

258. Id. at *4.Specifically, the court cited Jackson, 2009 WL 2508210; Case v. Gabriele
CraneRental, Inc., No. 2:08-CV-04197 SOW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117239 (W.D. Mo. Dec.
15, 2008); Highsmith v.First Step, Inc., No. 5:07CV00109 WRW, 2008 WL 2783473 (E.D.
Ark. July 16, 2008); Gries v. AKAL Security, Inc., No. 06-CV-33-LRR, 2007 WL 2710034
(S.D. Iowa Aug. 27,2007); and Brown v. L & P Industries,LLC, No. 5:04CV0379JLH, 2005
WL 3503637 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 21, 2005).
259. Ritchie, 2010 WL 502946, at *2.
260. Id. at *4.
261. Id. at *5.
262. Id.
263. 654 F. Supp. 2d 929 (E.D. Ark. 2009).

264. Id. at 931.
265. Id. at 934.
266. Id.
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felt bound to follow it and therefore determined that the plaintiff's
actions were protected. 67
It is therefore unclear where the Eighth Circuit stands on this
issue. Although district courts within the Eighth Circuit are divided
with respect to this issue, after Kasten, these internal complaints will
now most likely be protected under the FLSA. 65
D. A Unique Approach (and one that found its way to the Supreme
Court)-The Seventh Circuit's Opinion in Kasten: Written, But Not
Oral, Internal Complaints Are Protected
While the cases discussed up to this point have not addressed whether
there is a distinction between oral complaints and written complaints
made to an employer, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Kasten made that issue the focal point of its
opinion. 6 9 Specifically, while deciding that internal complaints are
covered under the FLSA, the court decided that the complaints must be
written.2 7 ° Eventually, the Supreme Court decided that oral complaints were also covered under the FLSA, and the Court oddly claimed
to have left open the issue of whether internal complaints are protected
at all.27'

267.

Id.

268. See Kasten, 131 S. Ct. 1325. Although that was not the specific question
addressed in Kasten, the Court's conclusion that both written and oral complaints are
covered, and its decision to formulate a test to be applied when complaints are made to
employers, certainly suggest that a plaintiff can lodge these complaints with his employer.
Justice Scalia assumed as much in his Kasten dissent. See id. at 1341 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also supra note 238 and accompanying text.
269. 570 F.3d at 837. Prior to the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Kasten, at least one
district court within the Seventh Circuit concluded that internal complaints to an employer
are covered by the FLSA. Hernandez v. City Wide Insulation of Madison, Inc., 508 F.
Supp. 2d 682, 689 (E.D. Wis. 2007). In Hernandez, the court relied on the phrases "any
complaint" and "related to" to conclude that the anti-retaliation provision covers internal
complaints. Id. The court also believed that a more narrow interpretation would make the
statute's reference to instituting a proceeding superfluous. Id. Finally, the court criticized
the Second Circuit's interpretation in Lambert as going against the FLSA's goal and
purpose. Id. at 689-90.
270. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 838-40. As previously noted, prior to the Seventh Circuit's
opinion in Kasten, at least one district court within the Seventh Circuit had decided that
internal complaints were protected under the FLSA. Hernandez, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 689.
The Seventh Circuit had the opportunity to decide the issue, but it decided not to answer
the question. Crowley v. Pace Suburban Bus Div. of the Reg'l Transp. Auth., 938 F.2d 797,
798 n.3 (7th Cir. 1991).
271. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1336. Although the majority claimed that it was not deciding
the issue of whether internal complaints are protected, by concluding that an internal, oral
complaint was protected, and by formulating a test to be used to determine whether
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In Kasten, the plaintiff brought suit after he was terminated, allegedly
for complaining about the company's time clock. The plaintiff alleged
that he complained that the clock's location was unlawful because its
location prevented employees from being paid for time spent putting on
and taking off the protective gear they were required to wear. He
claimed he told three individuals that the clock's location was illegal,
and he also claimed he told one supervisor that he was considering filing
a lawsuit.272 The court determined that there were two issues it had
to address. 273 First, it had to determine whether "intra-company
complaints that are not formally filed with any judicial or administrative
body are protected activity."274 Second, the court had to determine
whether "unwritten verbal complaints are protected activity."275 The
district court had concluded that only written internal complaints were
protected, and it granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant
because the plaintiff had made only oral complaints.276
The Seventh Circuit noted that it had never directly answered these
questions, but that it had handled two cases involving internal
complaints and did not have to decide whether these complaints were
protected. 7 Unlike several courts that relied mostly on other cases
and on policy considerations,278 the Seventh Circuit first looked at the
statutory language and concluded that "the plain language of the statute
279
indicates that internal, intracompany complaints are protected."
conclusion because of the statutory language,
The court reached this
2
"fied any complaint." 11

The court then addressed whether these complaints must be in
writing.28 1 The court concluded that the statute does require this.28 2

complaints to employers are protected, that conclusion is seemingly unavoidable. This was
noted by Justice Scalia, when he wrote that the majority "adopts a test for 'filed any
complaint' that assumes a 'yes' answer-and that makes no sense otherwise." Id. at 1341
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
272. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 836.
273. Id. at 837.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. The two cases to which the Seventh Circuit referred were Scott v. Sunrise
HealthCare Corp., 195 F.3d 938 (7th Cir. 1999), and Shea v. Galaxie Lumber &
Construction Co., 152 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 1998).
278. See supra section ILA.
279. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 838.
280. Id. (emphasis added); see also 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). As will be discussed later, the
Author disagrees with this part of the Seventh Circuit's opinion.
281. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 838.
282. Id. at 839.
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Again, the court focused on the statutory language, but instead of
focusing on the phrase "any complaint," the court focused on the word
"filed."2" The Seventh Circuit quoted the United States District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin below, which noted:
Expressing an oral complaint is not the same as filing a complaint. By
definition, the word "file" refers to "a collection of papers, records, etc.,
arranged in a convenient order," Random House Webster's College
Dictionary 489 (2d ed. 1999), or, when used in verb form as it is in the
statute, "[t]o deliver (a paper or instrument) to the proper officer so
that it is received by him to kept [sic] on file, or among the records of
his office," Webster's New International Dictionary of the English
Language 945 (2d ed. 1958). One cannot "file" an oral complaint; there
is no document, such as a paper or record, to deliver to someone who
can put it in its proper place.'
Disagreeing with the plaintiffs broad interpretation of "to file," the
court agreed with the lower court's analysis.2 5 The court noted that
"[ilooking only at the language of the statute, we believe that the district
court correctly concluded that unwritten, purely verbal complaints are
not protected activity. The use of the verb 'to file' connotes the use of a
writing."2 6 The court looked to Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary and concluded that those definitions "accord[U with what [it]
believe[d] to be the common understanding of the verb 'to file.' 287 The
court rejected the plaintiff's definition, which did not require a writing,
and it reiterated that "the natural understanding of the phrase 'fie any
complaint' requires the submission of some writing to an employer,
court, or administrative body."2"
The court concluded by noting that its interpretation "[was] confirmed
by the fact that Congress could have, but did not, use broader language
in the FLSA's [anti-]retaliation provision.""
The court proceeded to
compare the FLSA with Title VII29 ° and the ADEA,291 both of which
contain broad language in their anti-retaliation provisions, and

283. Id. at 838-39; see also 29 U.S.C. § 215(aX3).
284. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 838 (alteration in original) (quoting Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp., 619 F. Supp. 2d 608, 613 (W.D. Wis. 2008)).
285. Id. at 838-39.
286. Id. at 839.
287. Id. The court used three definitions from Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary: "to arrange in order for preservation and reference"; "to place among official
records as prescribed by law"; and "to perform the first act of (as a lawsuit)." Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 840.
290. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
291. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2006).
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29 2
concluded that the difference in language "appears to be significant."
Finally, the court acknowledged that while this type of remedial statute
should be interpreted broadly, "expansive interpretation is one thing;
reading words out of a statute is quite another."293 It then affirmed
the district court's judgment.9
The plaintiff petitioned for rehearing, however, the Seventh Circuit
denied that request. 95 Judge Rovner, with Judges Wood and Williams
joining, dissented from the court's denial of rehearing, criticizing the
Seventh Circuit for taking a position that was "contrary to the longstanding view of the Department of Labor, departed from the holdings
of other circuits, and interpreted the statutory language in a way that
[they] believe[d] is contrary to the understanding of Congress." 296 The
dissent first noted that the EEOC and the Department of Labor have
recognized that anti-retaliation provisions contained in other statutes
contain similar language, and as a result, the FLSA should be construed
Believing that these anti-retaliation provisions are
similarly.29
critical, the dissent quoted Mitchell, where the Court observed:

For weighty practical and other reasons, Congress did not seek to
secure compliance with prescribed standards through continuing
detailed supervision or inspection of payrolls. Rather, it chose to rely
on information and complaints received from employees seeking to
vindicate rights claimed to have been denied. Plainly, effective
enforcement could thus only be expected if employees felt free to
approach officials with their grievances. This end the prohibition of
§ 15(a)(3) against discharges and other discriminatory practices was
designed to serve. For it needs no argument to show that fear of
economic retaliation might often operate to induce aggrieved employees
quietly to accept substandard conditions. By the proscription of
retaliatory acts set forth in § 15(a)(3), and its enforcement in equity by
the Secretary [of Labor] in section 17, Congress sought to foster a
climate in which compliance with the substantive provisions of the Act
would be enhanced."
After relying on Mitchell, the judges noted that they agreed that the
anti-retaliation provision covers internal complaints. 99 The dissent

292. Kasten, 570 F.3d at 840 (citing Ball, 228 F.3d at 364).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 585 F.3d 310, 311 (7th Cir.
2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
296. Id. at 311 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
297. Id. at 311-12.
298. Id. at 312 (alteration in original) (quoting Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292).
299. Id.
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then criticized the restriction the district court placed on these complaints: that the complaints must be in writing. °° The dissent
believed that this conflicted with various opinions on this issue, and it
also conflicted with "what ha[d] been the Department of Labor's view for
nearly fifty years."'
Although the dissent agreed that the term "to
file" often suggests a writing, "it is by no means out of the ordinary to
read and hear the term... used more broadly to signify the making of
a report or the lodging of a protest."" 2 The dissent then cited (1)
several opinions and regulations that recognized oral "filings"; (2) several
statutes in which Congress required written complaints; and (3) two
previous opinions from the Seventh Circuit that "arguably reflect[ed] an
understanding of the statutory language that reaches oral as well as
written complaints."3 3 The three judges believed that these authorities supported their position that the FLSA covers both oral and written
internal complaints.3 '
The dissenting judges also believed that the rule adopted by the
Seventh Circuit could lead to results "based on happenstance."3 05 For
example, someone who is unable to meet with a company official to
discuss an FLSA issue would not be protected regardless of how specific
the oral complaint was, yet someone who leaves a note or sends an email
about the same FLSA issue would be protected.3" 6 The judges noted
that the focus of this inquiry should be on "whether the complaining
employee has communicated the substance of his concerns to the

300. Id. at 312-13.

301. Id. at 313.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 313-14. Specifically, the dissent relied on NLRB v. Southwest Electric
Cooperative, Inc., 794 F.2d 276, 279 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Bent, 702 F.2d 210,

212 (11th Cir. 1983); Ward v. Housatonic Area Regional Transit District, 154 F. Supp. 2d
339, 351 (D. Conn. 2001); and Rallis v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 63, 65 (N.D. Ill.
1985), as examples of cases where there were oral "filings"; it relied on 42 C.F.R.
§ 438.402(b)(3) (2012) and 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2012) as examples of regulations that allowed
oral filings; and it contrasted these with statutes that required written complaints, such
as the Federal Election Campaign Act, the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act, the
Packers and Stockyards Act, the Federal Seed Act, the Trade Agreements Act, the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the

Fair Housing Act, the Help America Vote Act, and the Federal Aviation Act. Kasten, 585
F.3d at 313-14 (Rovner, J., dissenting). The two Seventh Circuit cases upon which the

dissent relied were Sapperstein v. Hager, 188 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 1999), and Avitia v.
Metropolitan Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219 (7th Cir. 1995). Kasten, 585 F.3d at 314
(Rovner, J., dissenting).
304. Kasten, 585 F.3d at 313-15 (Rovner, J., dissenting).

305. Id. at 314.
306. Id.
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0
employer rather than on whether the communication was written.
The judges also noted that the Seventh Circuit's opinion could leave
unprotected verbal complaints to outside agencies. 3 8 It is this type of
limited protection, and these types of inconsistencies, the dissenting
judges found troubling:

By departing from such decisions, the court has left protected by the
statute only those interactions with agency representatives that take
place in written form, notwithstanding the fact that oral communications are just as essential to an employee attempting to ascertain her
rights and to the Department of Labor in discovering potential
violations of the FLSA, and notwithstanding the likelihood that an
employer bent on keeping its practices out of view of the regulators
might be just as likely to penalize an employee for her oral contacts
with the agency as it would any written contacts. 30 9
Finally, the judges believed that the Supreme Court's opinion in NLRB
v. Scrivener,31 ° which gave a pro-employee interpretation to the
National Labor Relations Act's anti-retaliation provision, and its opinion
in Mitchell, took a better approach to further the FLSA's objectives:
This court's decision that an employee's intra-company complaint is
protected by section 15(a)(3) pays appropriate homage to that role by
extending the statute's reach to the earliest opportunity that an
employee has to assert his statutory rights-in the workplace, with his
employer. Although the employee has filed nothing and testified to
nothing at that point in time, he has nonetheless taken the first step
toward the vindication of his rights. If he is penalized for taking that
step, he (and his co-workers) might well take no other. That is why, as
Scrivener explains, it is necessary to construe phrases like "filed
charges" or "filed any complaint" liberally to include not only those
ultimate acts but all of the necessary preceding steps that culminate
in those acts. And that is why, in my view, it makes "less than
complete sense" to draw a distinction
between an employee's written
31
and oral assertions of his rights. '

Although the dissenting judges were unable to convince the Seventh
Circuit to hear the case en banc, those judges were vindicated when the
Supreme Court concluded that both oral and written complaints were

307. Id.
308. Id. at 315.
309. Id.
310. 405 U.S. 117 (1972).
311. Kasten, 585 F.3d at 315-16 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). By stating that
the employee has "filed nothing," the judges were acknowledging that the plain language
of the statute does not cover this type of complaint. Id. at 316.
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The Supreme Court's opinion in Kasten will now be

IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION IN KASTEN
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp.,
not to answer whether internal complaints are protected, but rather to determine whether FLSA complaints
must be written.3 14 While it is logical to assume that if oral and
written complaints are protected, and the complaint made in Kasten was
to the plaintiff's employer, those facts necessarily answer whether
internal complaints in general are protected. Although the majority
considered the issue of whether internal complaints are protected
activity to be an open question even after its opinion, 15 Justice Scalia's
dissent pointed out in no uncertain terms that the Court's opinion made
it clear that by ruling that oral and written complaints are protected,
and by formulating a test to determine when an employee's complaint
to his employer is protected, the issue of whether the complaint must be
made to an outside entity was also answered. 316
A.

The Majority Opinion

Six Justices decided that complaints do not have to be written to be
protected under the FLSA,317 while Justices Scalia and Thomas
dissented. 318 The Court started its opinion by noting that the "sole
question presented is whether 'an oral complaint of a violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act' is 'protected conduct under the [Act's] antiretaliation provision." 3 1" The Court then noted that although the
phrase, "filed any complaint," when "considered in isolation" could be
ambiguous, when considered with "the purpose and context [of the Act],"

312. Kasten, 131 S.Ct. at 1329. Since Kasten, there has been at least one district court
opinion from within the Seventh Circuit in which the court has protected an internal, oral
complaint. See Johnson v. Mikolajewski & Assocs., No. 3:09-CV-405, 2011 WL 3273560,

at *2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 1, 2011).
313. 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
314. Id. at 1329-30; see also 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (granting cert.). For a detailed
discussion of the facts of Kasten, see supra section m(D).
315. Kasten, 131 S.Ct. at 1336.
316. Id. at 1341 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
317. Id. at 1328-29 (majority opinion).
318. Id. at 1336-41. Justice Kagan did not take part in the decision. Id, at 1336.
319. Id. at 1330 (alteration in original) (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kasten,
131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011) (No. 09-834), 2010 WL 146471, at *i).
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there was only one plausible interpretation-that oral complaints are
protected. 3 °
The Court started with the statutory text and the definition of the
word "filed."3 21 While acknowledging that some dictionaries' definitions could contemplate a writing, not all dictionary definitions do
In acknowledging the different definitions, the Court noted that
so.?
the differences were "significant because it means that dictionary
meanings, even if considered alone, do not necessarily limit the scope of
the statutory phrase to written complaints."3 23 The Court then noted
that "legislators, administrators, and judges have all sometimes used the
word 'file' in conjunction with oral statements."32 Further, the Court
noted that various federal agency regulations and some state statutes
also permit the filing of oral complaints. 3 25 Finally, the Court noted
the FLSA was passed, "oral filings were a known phenomethat when
32 6
non."
The Court then focused on the word "any."327 While acknowledging
that the word "filed" (when standing alone) "might suggest a narrow
interpretation limited to writings," the Court determined that "the
phrase 'any complaint' suggests a broad interpretation that would
include an oral complaint."3 2 ' The Court's subsequent attempt to look
at other uses of filed, or a variant thereof, proved fruitless, as the Court
concluded that the instances329in which that word appeared did not help
resolve the word's meaning.
In its final attempt to analyze the phrase, "filed any complaint," the
Court looked to other anti-retaliation provisions. 3 0 Noting both that
the language in those statutes was different than the FLSA's and that
the other anti-retaliation provisions were drafted more broadly, the
Court concluded:

320.
321.

Id. at 1330-31 (emphasis added); see also 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1331.

322. Id. The Court noted that the dictionaries that contemplate a writing include
Webster's New InternationalDictionary (2d ed. 1934), and Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary (1983). The dictionary that indicated that a "filing" could be oral is Funk and
Wagnalls New StandardDictionary of the English Language (rev. ed. 1938). Id.
323. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1331.

324. Id.
325. Id. at 1331-32. See, e.g.,

ALASKA STAT. § 47.32.090 (current through 2012 Legis.
Sess.), availableat www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/folio.asp; and 32 C.F.R. § 842.20 (2011).
326. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1332.

327.
328.
329.
330.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1332-33.
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Some of this language is broader than the phrase before us, but, given
the fact that the phrase before us lends itself linguistically to the
broader, "oral" interpretation, the use of broader language elsewhere
may mean (1) that Congress wanted to limit the scope of the phrase
before us to writings, or (2) that Congress did not believe the different
phraseology made a significant difference in this respect. The language
alone does not tell us whether Congress, if intending to protect orally
expressed grievances elsewhere, did or did not intend to leave those
oral grievances unprotected here."s '
The Court was therefore unable to definitively determine the meaning
of "filed any complaint."332 As a result, it looked to other tools of
statutory interpretation.33
The Court then focused on what it believed to be the FLSA's purpose
and concluded that a narrow interpretation would "undermine the Act's
basic objectives."'
Relying on Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry,
Inc.,335 it noted that the Act relies not on excessive federal supervision,
but rather on employees who are willing to vindicate rights they believe
they have been denied.33' Only a broad interpretation of the FLSA
would be effective in protecting employees against unfair working
conditions and economic retaliation if they were to speak out against
FLSA violations.33 7 The Court then noted that when the FLSA was
passed, many workers were both poor and illiterate, making a written
complaint both economically dangerous and difficult.33
Next, the
Court expressed concern that not protecting oral complaints would "also
take needed flexibility from those charged with the Act's enforcement."3 9 Specifically, the Court noted that not protecting oral complaints "could prevent Government agencies from using hotlines,
interviews, and other oral methods of receiving complaints. And insofar
as the anti[-]retaliation provision covers complaints made to employers
(a matter we need not decide), it would discourage the use of desirable
informal workplace grievance procedures to secure compliance with the
Act."3 40

331. Id. at 1333.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1333-34.
334. Id. at 1333.
335. 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
336. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1333.
337. Id. at 1334.
338. Id. at 1333-34.
339. Id. at 1334.
340. Id. (internal cross-reference omitted). Before moving on to address the employer's
arguments, the Court compared the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision to the National Labor
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The Court then addressed the employer's concern that allowing oral
complaints would leave employers in "a state of uncertainty" regarding
3 ' The Court
whether an employee was making an FLSA complaint.
agreed that an employer must have fair notice that an employee was
making an FLSA complaint, and it concluded that the complaint must
contain a "degree of formality."' 2 Specifically, an employee's complaint must be such that "the recipient has been given fair notice that
a grievance has been lodged and does, or should, reasonably understand
the matter as part of its business concerns. " ' In wrapping up this
issue, the Court concluded:
To fall within the scope of the anti [-]retaliation provision, a complaint
must be sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to
understand it, in light of both content and context, as an assertion of
rights protected by the statute and a call for their protection. This
standard can be met, however, by oral complaints, as well as by
written ones. 3"
The Court then addressed whether it should defer to the administrative agencies' interpretations of the FLSA."45 The Court first looked
at the Secretary of Labor's interpretation. 4 According to the Court,
"[tihe Secretary of Labor has consistently held the view that the words
'filed any complaint' cover oral, as well as written, complaints."' 7 The
Court noted that the Labor Department has "acted in accordance with
that view by creating a hotline to receive oral complaints." '4 The
Court then noted the EEOC has taken a similar pro-employee position
Concluding that these interpretations were
in several briefs. 9
Relations Act's anti-retaliation provision. Id. Believing that the two statutes shared a
common goal, and noting that the Court had given a broad interpretation to the NLRA, the
Court found additional support for a broad interpretation of the FLSA. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. Within this sentence, the Court used the phrase "grievance has been lodged."
Id. Congress certainly could have used this phrase, or something similar to it, if it wanted
to ensure that internal complaints were protected under the FLSA.
344: Id. at 1335 (emphasis added). It is this test that proves that despite the majority's
claim to the contrary, it seemingly was answering the question of whether internal
complaints are protected. There would be no need to articulate this test if internal
complaints were not protected; however, by setting forth how detailed an employee
complaint must be in order to be considered protected activity, the Court was, in fact,
telling lower courts how to handle cases involving internal FLSA complaints.
345. Id. at 1335-36.
346. Id. at 1335.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
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"reasonable," consistent with the FLSA, and had been held for long
periods of time, the Court believed it owed these interpretations
deference. °
Finally, the Court addressed (or, more accurately, failed to address)
the bigger question involved in FLSA retaliation claims-whether an
employee's internal complaint is protected.3 5' As previously noted, the
Seventh Circuit in Kasten concluded that only written complaints to an
employer were protected." 2 The employer did not raise the internal/external issue in response to the employee's petition for certiorari,
but rather raised this issue in its brief on the merits. 53 Noting that
the Court does "not normally consider a separate legal question not
raised in the certiorari briefs," the Court decided that it would adhere
to that policy in this case.354 The majority believed that "[riesolution
of the Government/private employer question is not a 'predicate to an
intelligent resolution' of the oral/written question that [the Court]
granted certiorari to decide" and decided not to address that important
issue.355 The Court then noted that it could decide the oral/written
question separately, and that it had done so, ruling in favor of the
employee.35 6 It then stated that it expressed "no view" on whether
complaints must be made to a court or government agency (as opposed
to an employer) to be protected.3 57

350. Id. at 1335-36. After this analysis, the Court rejected the employer's argument
that the rule of lenity should be applied to this case. Id. at 1336. The Court concluded
that "after engaging in traditional methods of statutory interpretation, [it] [could not] find
that the statute remains sufficiently ambiguous to warrant application of the rule of lenity
[in this case]." Id.
351. Id. at 1336.
352. 570 F.3d 834, 840 (7th Cir. 2009), rev'd 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
353. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1336.
354. Id.
355. Id. (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 75 n.13 (1996)); see also SuP.
CT. R. 15.2.

356. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1336.
357. Id. In concluding that oral complaints were protected, and in establishing a test
to determine whether an employee's complaint to his employer was protected, it seems
strange that the Court would indicate that it was not expressing an opinion on the question
of whether internal complaints are protected. As a result of this decision, the employee in
Kasten, who orally complained to his employer, was protected as long as the employee met
the court's standard, which strongly suggests that despite its protestations to the contrary,
the Court did decide that internal complaints are protected. Justice Scalia made a similar
point when he stated that "[wihile claiming that it remains an open question whether
intra [-company complaints are covered, the opinion adopts a test for 'filed any complaint'
that assumes a 'yes' answer.. . ." Id. at 1341 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also supra note
344 and accompanying text.
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The Dissenting Opinion

Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justice Thomas
The main point Justice Scalia addressed was not the
joined. 58
difference between oral and written complaints, but whether any
359
According to Justice Scalia, the
internal complaints were protected.
6 °
Justice Scalia started by
FLSA did not protect internal complaints.
quoting the statutory language and noting that the critical phrase was
"filed any complaint." 6 1 While conceding that the term "complaint"
could, in some cases, include the type of oral statements the plaintiff
made, when used in the legal context, the term "complaint" means "[a]
formal allegation or charge against a party, made or presented to the
appropriate court or officer."362 After quoting from two other dictionar363
Justice Scalia noted that there were
ies to bolster his conclusion,
"several reasons" to assume that the specialized, legal-context meaning
6
First,
of complaint applied to the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision."
he noted that each time complaint is used in the FLSA, it refers to "an
365
Because of this, and
official filing with a governmental body."
because "[i]dentical words used in different parts of a statute are

358. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 133641. Justice Thomas concurred with Justice Scalia in all
but a single footnote. Id. at 1336.
359. Id. at 1337-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
360. Id. at 1337.
361. Id.
362.

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

546 (2d ed. 1934)).
363. Id. The two other dictionaries were the Cambridge Dictionary of American
English (2000) and the Oxford English Dictionary(2d ed. 1989). Id. The two additional
definitions were: "a formal statement to a government authority that you have a legal
cause to complain about the way you have been treated" and "[a] statement of injury or
grievance laid before a court or judicial authority .. . for purposes of prosecution or of
redress." Id. (emphasis added); see also CambridgeDictionaryofAmerican English (2000);
Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989).
364. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
365. Id. Specifically, the other places in the FLSA where the term complaint is used
are in sections 216(b) and (c). 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)-(c) (2006). The sentence in § 216(b)
containing the word "complaint" states in relevant part: "[tihe right provided by this
subsection to bring an action by or on behalf of any employee, and the right of any
employee to become a party plaintiff to any such action, shall terminate upon the filing of
a complaint by the Secretary of Labor. .. ." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The sentence in § 216(c)
containing the word "complaint" states in relevant part: "The right provided by subsection
(b)... shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary... unless such
action is dismissed without prejudice on motion of the Secretary." Id. § 216(c). As Justice
Scalia points out, "these provisions unquestionably use 'complaint' in the narrow legal
sense." Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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presumed to have the same meaning absent contrary indication," he
believed that the term complaint meant a formal, written filing. 66
Justice Scalia then focused on the fact that the term complaint is
contained within the phrase "filed any complaint."" 7 The fact that
Congress chose the word filed provided more evidence that internal
grievances are not protected.3 68 Had Congress used the word "made"
when referring to a complaint, the plaintiff's argument would have been
stronger; however, the word filed "at least suggests a degree of formality
consistent with legal action and inconsistent ... with employee-toemployer complaints." 369 Next, he noted that because "'[tihe law uses

familiar legal expressions in their familiar legal sense,"' and that 'Tiling
a complaint" is usually used in the more formal context, the FLSA does
not cover internal complaints.3

70

He also compared the FLSA's

language to the Mine Health Safety Act (MHSA)
MHSA used the phrase "filed ... or made ...

71

and noted that the

a complaint" and also

specifically included complaints to mine operators.3 72 Thus, the MHSA
offered broader protection than the FLSA, and Congress could have used
similar language in the FLSA had it wanted to do so."'
There were more reasons Justice Scalia believed the term "complaint"
did not cover internal complaints. 374 First, "filed any complaint" is
listed with three other activities, all of which involve "interaction with
governmental authority," and when items in a list share a common
attribute, all of those items should be interpreted as sharing that
attribute. 375 Because the other activities involved either a judicial or
376
administrative body, internal complaints did not fit within that list.

Second, no private right of action for retaliation existed until 1977; until
that time, only the Department of Labor could enforce the antiretaliation provision.377 Justice Scalia noted, because of this, that it

366. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
367. Id. at 1337-38.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Henry v. United States, 251 U.S. 393, 395
(1920)). Justice Scalia also made a point of this while questioning the Respondent's counsel
during oral argument. Oral Argument, supra note 22, at 10:12.
371. The Mine Health Safety Act's anti-retaliation provision can be found at 30 U.S.C.
§ 815(c)(1) (2006).
372. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1338 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also 30
U.S.C. § 815(cXl).
373. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1338 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
374. Id. at 1338-39.
375. Id. at 1338.
376. Id.
377. Id.
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would have been strange to require an employee to go to the Department
of Labor "to establish, and punish retaliation for, his intracompany
complaint, [rather] than to require the [Department of Labor]-protected
complaint to be filed with the [Department of Labor] in the first
place."378
Because Justice Scalia believed that the phrase "filed any complaint'
clearly did not cover internal complaints, there was no need to go beyond
379
Although Kasten
that language and look at congressional purpose.
with the
consistent
was
complaints
argued that protecting internal
were
complaints
internal
that
FLSA's purpose, Justice Scalia suggested
to
employers
expose
to
"unwilling
was
not protected because Congress
which
workers,
unsatisfactory
dismiss
the litigation, or to the inability to
38 °
He continued: "[llimitation of the
the additional step would entail."
retaliation provision to agency complaints may have been an attempt 'to
achieve the benefits of regulation right up to the point where the costs
of further benefits exceed the value of those benefits."''
Justice Scalia then rejected Kasten's attempts to argue that because
more recent anti-retaliation provisions cover internal complaints, the
3 2
Court should broadly interpret the FLSA. " He correctly pointed out
that those statutes use broader language than the FLSA, and none uses
In further rejecting Kasten's
the "filed any complaint" language.'
argument, Justice Scalia noted that while the "Court has sometimes
sanctioned a 'living Constitution,' it has never approved a living United
States Code."3"4 Accordingly, Justice Scalia argued, the FLSA must be
interpreted according to its terms, despite the fact that the statute is
over seventy years old. 3"
Next, Justice Scalia addressed whether the Department of Labor and
the EEOC's position on this issue was entitled to deference, and he
determined that their pro-employee interpretation was not entitled to
38
He also noted
deference because it lacked "the power to persuade."
that the EEOC does not have the authority to make rules "carrying the
force of law," and that the Department of Labor does not have authority

378.

Id.

379. Id. at 1339.
380. Id.
381. Id.; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains,50 U. CI. L. REV. 533, 541

(1983).
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1339 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1339-40.
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to issue regulations interpreting the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision. 3817
Finally, Justice Scalia addressed whether the internal/external
complaint issue was properly before the Court.38 While the majority
claimed that it was not addressing this issue,"' the Court's opinion,
when applied to the facts of Kasten, along with the test the Court
articulated for determining what constitutes protected activity, leads to
the conclusion that internal complaints, whether oral or written, are
protected, as those were the facts presented in Kasten.390 Justice
Scalia pointed this out when he noted the following: "While claiming
that it remains an open question whether intracompany complaints are
covered, the opinion adopts a test for 'filed any complaint' that assumes
a 'yes' answer ... .""' He reiterated that the two issues are inextricably linked when he criticized the majority by stating that "[tihe test the
Court adopts amply disproves its contention that 'we can decide the
oral/written question separately.' And it makes little sense to consider
that question at all in the present case if neither oral nor written
complaints to employers are protected."39 ' Thus, although the majority
claimed to have left the internal/external complaint issue unresolved,
Justice Scalia argued that if sufficiently specific written and oral
complaints are covered, and the complaint at issue in Kasten was an
internal complaint (and was possibly protected), the logical conclusion
is that internal complaints are, in fact, protected.39 3 It would make no
sense for the Court to hold that oral and written complaints are
protected, establish a test to determine when an employee's complaint
to his employer is protected, and then claim that it had not answered the
question of whether a complaint must be made to an outside entity.
Nevertheless, this is what the Kasten majority did.394
V. DOES THE FLSA's ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION'S LANGUAGE
PROTECT INTERNAL COMPLAINTS?

While most people would agree that employees should be protected for
voicing FLSA concerns to employers, if the statute does not provide for
such protection, courts should not bend over backwards to reach that

387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

Id. at 1340.
Id. at 1340-41.
Id. at 1336 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1341 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
See supra section IV.A.
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result. Based on the arguments made by the employer and Justice
Scalia in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.,"' the
Second Circuit's opinion in Lambert v. Genesee Hospital,"' and the
courts that followed Lambert, the FLSA does not protect such conduct.
At the very most, the statute protects only written complaints, as no
reasonable interpretation of the word filed can be said to apply to oral
397
Although most courts have
complaints lodged with an employer.
concluded that oral and written internal complaints are protected, these
courts did so with either little analysis of the statutory language, or, in
the case of the Supreme Court, by claiming that it was not making that
determination.3 8
There are several reasons why the FLSA does not protect internal
complaints. First, when comparing the text of the FLSA to the text of
other employment-related, anti-retaliation provisions, it is clear that the
FLSA's provision provides less protection. Second, although Congress
has been aware of this issue since at least 1993 and has amended the
FLSA several times since then, it has failed to clarify this issue, despite
the fact that some courts have held that internal complaints are not
covered. Third, although remedial statutes such as the FLSA should be
interpreted broadly, courts should not interpret statutes in a manner
that conflicts with their language simply to further a particular goal.
Finally, the language and the context of the phrase "filed any complaint"
9
do not allow for an interpretation that covers internal complaints. '
Although courts in a post-Kasten world will most likely protect internal
complaints,400 those courts, as did the Supreme Court, will be putting
policy ahead of the FLSA's language.
A. The FLSA's Anti-retaliationProvision'sLanguage and Other AntiretaliationProvisions'Language
One piece of evidence that demonstrates that internal complaints are
not protected is the difference between the language found in the FLSA's
anti-retaliation provision and the language found in other statutes' antiSpecifically, Congress used much broader
retaliation provisions.

395. 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
396. 10 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1993), overruled in part by Kasten, 131 S. Ct. 1325.
397. See Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1337-41; Lambert, 10 F.3d at 55-56. In fact, although
only Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented, other Justices joked during the oral argument
of this case regarding using the term "filed" to refer to an oral statement. See Oral
Argument, supra note 22.
398. See supra sections II.A & V.A.
399. At most, because Congress used the phrase, "filed any complaint," only written
grievances should be covered. 29 U.S.C. § 215.
400. See supra note 43.
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language when drafting Title VIIs anti-retaliation provision,"° the
ADA's anti-retaliation provision,40 2 the ADEA's anti-retaliation provision,4 °3 and the FMLA!s anti-retaliation provision,4 °4 and because of
this, the statutes should not be interpreted similarly. In the abovereferenced statutes, Congress included some type of "opposition clause,"
something completely lacking in the FLSA. 4°5 Had Congress wanted
to provide the same level of protection as it provided under the FLSA
under these newer statutes, it certainly could have simply used similar
language when drafting the newer statutes, or it could have amended
the FLSA to include an opposition clause. However, Congress chose to
include the broader "opposition" language in the newer statutes, and
despite this lack of opposition language in the FLSA, many courts
focused on what they believed to be the policy behind these antiretaliation provisions and essentially (and erroneously) applied this type
of opposition clause to FLSA cases.40 6
Some courts have, however, acknowledged the difference between antiretaliation provisions with an opposition clause and the FLSA's
provision. The Second Circuit in Lambert started its analysis with a
comparison of Title VII and the FLSA and concluded that because the
FLSA does not contain an opposition clause, internal complaints were
not protected. 40 7 Also, in Boateng v. Terminex International Co., 40
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
distinguished Title VII from the FLSA and concluded that the FLSA's
lack of an opposition clause was evidence that the FLSA's provision is

401.
402.
403.
404.

42 U.S.C.
42 U.S.C.
29 U.S.C.
29 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-3(a) (2006).
§ 12203(a) (2006).
§ 623(d) (2006).
§ 2615 (2006).

405. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (protecting employees who "ha[ve] opposed any

practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII]"), 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)

(protecting employees who "halve] opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [the

ADA]"), and 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (protecting employees who "halve] opposed any practice
made unlawful by [the ADEA]") with 29 U.S.C. § 215(aX3) (containing no similar opposition

clause).
406. See supra section lIHA Furthermore, the original purpose of the FLSA's antiretaliation provision was to encourage employees to provide information to the Department
of Labor. Brief for Respondent, supra note 41, at 22-24. Protecting intra-company
complaints does not further that goal. Id.
407. Lambert, 10 F.3d at 55. The Fourth Circuit in Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co. also
compared the FLSA with Title VII (and the ADEA) and concluded that the difference in
the statutes' language was one reason to interpret them differently. 228 F.3d 360,364(4th
Cir. 2000).
408. No. 07-617, 2007 WL 2572403 (E.D. Va. Sept. 4, 2007).
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narrower than Title VII's. ° Similarly, the dissenting judge in EEOC
v. Romeo Community Schools41 ° distinguished between Title VII and
the FLSA.4 ' He concluded that had that case involved Title VII, he
"might [have] agree[d]" with the majority.4 12 Specifically, he noted the
following: "[iun addition to the... conduct specified in [the FLSA's antiretaliation provision], Title VII expressly includes an opposition clause,
which protects employees who protest unlawful employment practices to
their employers. [The FLSA] contains no such provision and I cannot
join the majority in reading one in."" Therefore, although it is the
minority position, some judges have determined that the difference
between the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision and the anti-retaliation
provisions with opposition clauses is one reason to provide less protection
under the FLSA.414
When Congress enacted these newer statutes, it knew of the FLSA's
language, yet it chose to use broader language in these statutes. One
conclusion is that because Congress used different language, it meant for
the new statutes to provide different levels of protection. As the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia noted,

409. Id. at *3. Since Boateng, the Fourth Circuit has affirmatively held that internal
complaints are protected under the FLSA. Minor v. Bostwick Laboratories, Inc., 669 F.3d
428 (4th Cir. 2012). While the Fourth Circuit has decided to protect internal complaints,
some of the arguments made by district courts within the Fourth Circuit before Minor,
although now not particularly relevant within the Fourth Circuit, still provide strong
analysis why internal complaints should not be protected.
410. 976 F.2d 985 (6th Cir. 1992).
411. Id. at 990 (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
412. Id.
413. Id. (citation omitted). Another case from the Eastern District of Virginia
expressed the same sentiment regarding the differences between Title VII and the FLSA
when it noted the following:
Congress must be held to the plain meaning of its statutes; it must be held to
have said what it meant. Title VII includes an "opposition clause" and the FLSA
does not. This telling difference points persuasively to the conclusion that
protected activity under the FLSA is a smaller universe of conduct than the
universe of protected activity under Title VII. The latter includes informal
protests or complaints, the former explicitly does not.
O'Neill v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 956 F. Supp. 661,664 (E.D. Va. 1997) (footnote omitted).
See also Bartis v. John Bommarito Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1000
(E.D. Mo. 2009) (noting the differences between Title VII and the FLSA and concluding
that this difference was evidence that internal complaints were not protected under the
FLSA); but see supra text accompanying notes 222, 409 (regarding the Fourth Circuit's
current view on this issue and the value of the district court opinions within the Fourth
Circuit).
414. See Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217,223 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting
that Congress's decision to use broader language in Title VII than in ERISA evidenced
Congress's intent that the provisions be interpreted differently).
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"[blecause Congress chose not to include an 'opposition' clause in [the
FLSA], it stands to reason that Congress' intent was for [the FLSA] to
cover a more narrow range of employee
activities than are covered by the
4 15
anti-retaliation clause of Title

VII.

Therefore, this lack of an opposition clause, and Congress's failure to
add one, is evidence that supports the conclusion that internal complaints are not covered under the FLSA. As will be discussed next,
unless and until Congress adds such an opposition clause to the FLSA,
courts will continue to misinterpret the FLSA and provide more
protection than the statute's language allows.4 16
B.

Congress's Failure to Amend the FLSA's Anti-retaliationProvision
Another indication that internal complaints are not protected under
the FLSA is that Congress has not amended the FLSA's anti-retaliation
provision despite being on notice that some courts had decided that
internal complaints were not protected, and despite knowing that it
could have guaranteed this protection by adding an opposition
clause.417 The case of Lambert is almost twenty years old, and Ball v.

Memphis Bar-B-Q Co. 411 was decided over ten years ago. Since then,

not only has Congress failed to amend the FLSA's anti-retaliation
provision, but it has amended other provisions of the FLSA.419 In fact,
since Lambert, Congress has amended the FLSA more than ten times,
yet it has not amended the narrow language contained in its anti415. Bell-Holcombe v. Ki, LLC, 582 F. Supp. 2d 761, 764 (E.D. Va. 2008); but see supra
text accompanying notes 222,409 (regarding the Fourth Circuit's current view on this issue
and the value of the district court opinions within the Fourth Circuit); Mansfield v.
Billington, 432 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D.D.C. 2006), supra section III(A)(8). The court observed
that the significant difference between the EPA and Title VII (the lack of an opposition
clause in the EPA) requires the conclusion that the scope of protection under these statutes
is different. Mansfield, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 74.

416.

The Fourth Circuit in Ball also addressed the difference between Title VIl's anti-

retaliation provision and the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision. 228 F.3d at 364-65.
Specifically, when addressing the "testimony" clause of the anti-retaliation provision, the
court noted the following:
If the allegations were proved to be true, such offensive conduct would provide an
example of why Congress found it necessary in other contexts to enact broader
anti-retaliation provisions. But this moral judgment does not justify a conclusion-contrary to the plain language of the FLSA-that [the plaintiffs] complaint
states a cause of action under the Act.
Id. at 365 (citation omitted).
417. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 41, at 38-39. One senator did, however,
attempt to amend and broaden the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision; that proposal,
however, has not since been acted upon. See S.3256, 112th Cong. (2012).
418. 228 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2000).
419. Brief for Respondent, supra note 41, at 38-39.
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retaliation provision.4 2 ° If Congress wanted to show its intent that the
anti-retaliation provision should be interpreted broadly, it certainly could
have added an opposition clause during one of the many times it
amended the FLSA.
This type of issue has come up before in the employment-law context.
For example, when the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether an
ADEA plaintiff needed direct evidence to receive a mixed-motive jury
instruction, the Court decided there was not even a mixed-motive cause
of action under the ADEA.421 The Court reached this conclusion
because while Congress amended Title VII in 1991 to include a mixedmotive cause of action,422 it failed to include a similar cause of action
under the ADEA, despite the fact that it amended other provisions of the
ADEA at that time.422
Applying Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.4" here, because
Congress has amended the FLSA several times after learning that some
courts had narrowly interpreted the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision
and Congress did not add an opposition clause to the Act's antiretaliation provision, a logical conclusion is that Congress intended for
the FLSA to offer a different level of protection than anti-retaliation
provisions with opposition clauses. 425 The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia noted this when it stated: "[sihould
Congress, on reflection, consider sound public policy to require a
different result, it may follow the example of Title VII and amend the
FLSA to add an 'opposition clause."' 426 However, because Congress
has chosen not to do so, internal complaints are not covered.
By not adding an opposition clause despite knowing that some courts
had taken a narrow approach when applying the FLSA's anti-retaliation
provision, Congress has expressed its intent to afford plaintiffs less
protection under the FLSA than under other employment-related, antiretaliation provisions.42 7 As a result, plaintiffs should be protected
under this provision only if they file external complaints.42

420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.

Id.
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 169-70 (2009).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
Gross, 557 U.S. at 174.
557 U.S. 167 (2009).
See supra notes 408-17 and accompanying text.

426. O'Neill, 956 F. Supp. at 665; but see Minor, 669 F.3d 428 (holding that internal
complaints are protected within the Fourth Circuit).
427. See supra notes 408-17.
428. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 41, at 38-39.
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C. Liberally Construinga Statute Is Not the Same as Re-writing One
Although several courts have relied on what they believed to be the
FLSA's purpose when deciding that internal complaints are protected,
as the court noted in Edwards v.A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc.,42 9 simply
because a statute was intended for a particular purpose, this does not
allow a court to "ignore clear statutory language." 0 This was echoed
in O'Neill v.Allendale Mutual Insurance Co.,431 when the court, after
acknowledging that policy might favor a broad interpretation of the
FLSA's anti-retaliation provision, correctly noted:
[W]here Congress has made the public policy decision and expressed it
clearly, as in § 215(a)(3)'s plain and unambiguous language, it is not
open to courts to trump or change this decision in the name of
statutory interpretation. Courts have no license or authority to
disregard a statute's plain language 43for
the purpose of reaching a
2
result the court deems more sensible.
Similarly, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia in Meredith-Clinevell v. Department of Juvenile Justice"8
ruled that internal complaints are not protected.4 4 The court noted
that a broad interpretation was not supported by the statutory language,
and that "'[wihile [the court] [is] instructed to read the FLSA to effect
its remedial purposes, the statutory language clearly places limits on the
range of retaliation proscribed by the Act. ' The court in Bartis v.
John Bommarito Oldsmobile-Cadillac,Inc.436 also recognized the limits
placed on a court in light of a statute's language when it noted that "the
statute cannot be construed so broadly as to depart from its plain and
clear language." ' 7 Also, the Fourth Circuit in Ball made several
statements regarding the FLSA's remedial purpose but ultimately
decided that the statute's language controlled. 48' Finally, the Seventh
429. 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010).
430. Id. at 223-24.
431. 956 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Va. 1997).
432. Id. at 664 n.6; see also supra text accompanying notes 222, 409 (regarding the
Fourth Circuit's current view on this issue and the value of the district court opinions
within the Fourth Circuit).
433. 344 F. Supp. 2d 951 (W.D. Va. 2004).
434. Id. at 955; but see supra text accompanying notes 222, 409 (regarding the Fourth
Circuit's current view on this issue and the value of the district court opinions within the
Fourth Circuit).
435. Id. (quoting Ball, 228 F.3d at 364).
436. 626 F. Supp. 2d 994 (E.D. Mo. 2009).
437. Id. at 999.
438. 228 F.3d at 363-65.
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Circuit in Kasten observed that "expansive interpretation is one thing;
reading words out of a statute is quite another." 9
Although many courts used the "remedial purpose" argument to
support their conclusion that internal complaints are protected,"
Some of the
some courts have correctly rejected that approach."
courts adopting the broad interpretation have even acknowledged that
the statutory language does not include internal complaints, and yet
these courts violated the canon of statutory construction that a statute's
language must control its interpretation." 2 Despite this, as the
minority of courts has pointed out, because the anti-retaliation
provision's language does not cover internal complaints, the FLSA's
"remedial purpose" should take a back seat to the words Congress used
when drafting the statute.
D. The Meaning and Context of "FiledAny Complaint"
When answering the question presented in this Article, the critical
phrase is "filed any complaint."" 3 It is therefore appropriate to look
at the ordinary meaning and context of the words making up this
After doing so, it is clear that
phrase--"complaint" and "filed."'
internal complaints are not covered under the FLSA's anti-retaliation
provision. At the very most, evaluating the ordinary meaning of the
statute's words (especially "filed") leads to the conclusion that if any
internal complaints are protected, only written internal complaints are
protected, which is what the Seventh Circuit decided in Kasten.'
In a non-legal context, and when not preceded by the word "filed,"
complaint could encompass a statement made to an employer." 6
However, as Justice Scalia noted in Kasten, "complaint" has a specialized
meaning when used in the legal context, and when interpreting statutes,
it is this legal meaning that controls." 7 According to the Cambridge
Dictionaryof American English, one definition of complaint is "a formal
statement to a government authority that you have a legal cause to

439.

440.

570 F.3d 834, 840 (7th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
See supra section III(A).

441. See supra section mI(B).
442. See EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989) ("The
charging parties did not perform an act that is explicitly listed in the FLSA's antiretaliationprovision.. . .") (emphasis added).

443.
444.
445.
446.

29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
This Article will also address the third word in that phrase, "any."
570 F.3d at 840.
Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1337 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also WEBSTER'S NEW

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 546 (2d ed. 1934).

447. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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complain about the way you have been treated."18 Similarly, the
Oxford English Dictionarydefines complaint as "[a] statement o [fi] injury
or grievance laid before a court or judicial authority... for purposes of
prosecution or of redress .... . Webster's New InternationalDictionary defines complaint as "[a] formal allegation or charge against a
party, made or presented to the appropriate court or officer .... "'
Thus, all three sources require the complaint to be made to some type
of governmental or judicial authority.45' Finally, although not cited in
either opinion in Kasten, Black's Law Dictionarydefines a complaint as
"[tihe initial pleading that starts a civil action and states the basis for
the court's jurisdiction, the basis for the plaintiff's claim, and the
4 2
demand for relief."
As Justice Scalia pointed out in Kasten, it is logical to assume that
Congress meant complaint to take on this specialized, legal meaning in
the FLSA. 45 First, every time Congress used complaint in the FLSA,
it took on this formal, legal meaning. 454 And, as Justice Scalia noted,
a common canon of statutory construction is that when Congress uses
the same words in the same statute, there is a presumption that the
words should be interpreted similarly. 455 Second, when interpreting
statutes, it is important to note that "'[the law uses familiar legal
expressions in their familiar legal sense.""'56 Applying these ideas
here, it is clear that "filed any complaint" does not cover internal
complaints.
Although Congress chose to modify complaint with the word any,"'
that does not mean that the above-referenced legal definitions of
complaint do not apply to the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision. As
counsel for Saint-Gobain pointed out, any must be viewed in the context
of the FLSA as a whole, not in the isolated context of the phrase "fied
any complaint."'5 " When viewed in that context, it is clear that "any

448.

CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH 172 (2000) (emphasis added).

449. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1337 (alteration in original) (emphasis added); see also 3
OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 608 (2d ed. 1988).
450. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1337 (alteration in original) (emphasis added); see also
WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 546 (2d ed. 1934).

451. Admittedly, these three dictionaries are not typically considered "legal
authorities."
452. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 323 (9th ed. 2009).
453. 131 S. Ct. at 1337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
454. Id.; see also supra note 365.
455. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1337.
456. Id. at 1338 (alteration in original) (quoting Henry v. United States, 251 U.S. 393,
395 (1920)).
457. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
458. Brief for Respondent, supra note 41, at 17-20.
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45 9
complaint" does not include complaints made to an employer.
Specifically, applying the previously-mentioned rule of statutory
construction that "[iidentical words used in different parts of a statute
are presumed to have the same meaning," it is critical to note that in all
other places of the FLSA where Congress used the word "complaint,"
that word took on its more formal, legal meaning.4 60 Thus, by using
the phrase "any complaint," Congress did not intend to include
employee-to-employer grievances.46 1
As is clear from the previous discussion, the term filed is also critical
to this issue. As was the case with complaint, it is important to look at
definitions to determine what the term means. And once again, these
definitions demonstrate that internal grievances are not protected.
Specifically, and as the employer pointed out in Kasten, filed can mean
the following: (1) "to make an official record of [something], or to begin
a legal process"; (2) "[t]o place (a document) in due manner among the
records of a court or public office"; and (3) "Itlhe formal presentation of
a document to the official whose duty it will then be to place it on his
file."4 2 When read in conjunction with the rest of the FLSA's anti-

459. Id.
460. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1337 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See supra note 365.
461. Counsel for Saint-Gobain also used the following argument when addressing the
word "any":
Kasten argues that Congress's use of the words "any complaint" indicates that
§ 215(a)(3) encompasses complaints in any form, including oral complaints. This
argument wrongly treats the words "any complaint" as if they stood alone. In fact,
those words are governed by the verb "filed." That choice of verb limits the range
of protected "complaints" to those that can be "filed." Returning to the bank
example, if a person says, "You may deposit this check in any bank," he obviously
means only the type of bank in which a check can be deposited; a blood bank or
an elevator bank would not do. So too here: Because an oral complaint cannot be
"filed" unless it is reduced to writing, it does not fall within the plain meaning of
the phrase "filed any complaint." The word "any" signifies only that the statute
protects complaints about any subject related to the FLSA.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 41, at 29.
462. Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added); see also CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
ENGLISH at 318; 5 OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY at 904; A DICTIONARY OF MODERN

USAGE at 130-31 (1935) (emphasis added). As the First Circuit noted in Valerio
v. PutnamAssociates, the term "filed" could also mean either "'to deliver (as a legal paper
or instrument) after complying with any condition precedent (as the payment of a fee) to
the proper officer for keeping on file or among the records of his office'" or "'to place (as a
paper or an instrument) on file among the legal or official records of an office esp[ecially]
by formally receiving, endorsing, and entering.'" 173 F.3d 35,41 (1st Cir. 1999) (alteration
in original); see also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY at 849 (1971).
Black's Law Dictionary also supports the conclusion that "to file" requires a writing.
Specifically, it defines "file" as "[t]o deliver a legal document to the court clerk or record
custodian for placement into the official record"; "[tlo commence a lawsuit"; "[t]o record or
AMERICAN
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retaliation provision (and especially with the term "complaint"), it is
clear that the phrase "filed any complaint" requires more than an
exchange between an employee and his employer. Had Congress used
the words 'lodged" or "made" or "voiced" when referring to complaints
(as it used "made" in the MHSA), the pro-employee argument on this
issue would have been stronger."' However, by using "filed," which
connotes a more formal meaning, Congress used language that does not
support the conclusion that internal complaints are protected. Counsel
for Saint-Gobain made this argument in its brief when it noted that
other statutes such as the National Transit Systems Security Act,4 "
the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, 65 and the Asbestos
Hazard Emergency Response Act 466 (among others) provide more

protection based on the much broader language used in those statutes.467 Further, the use of the phrase 'Tied any complaint" is more
commonly understood to cover a legal complaint rather than a less
formal exchange with an employer.4 ss
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
agreed with this more formal meaning when it noted that "[tihe concept
of 'filing' a complaint contemplates following some form of official
4 6'
procedure."
After making this statement, the Boateng court ruled
that internal complaints are not protected. 470 Another case from the
Eastern District of Virginia reached the same conclusion about the
FLSA's language when it noted that its anti-retaliation provision "could

deposit something in an organized retention system or container for preservation and
future reference"; and "[t]o acknowledge and deposit (a report, communication, or other
document) for information and reference only without necessarily taking any substantive
action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 704 (9th ed. 2009).

463. See Valerio, 173 F.3d at 41. Congress did use such language in the Mine Health
Safety Act, when it used the phrase "filed or made a complaint." 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(1)
(2006) (emphasis added). This demonstrates that Congress can, when it wants to do so,
provide broad protection to workers. Congress also showed this willingness to provide
broad protection in other statutes such as Title VII, where it included an opposition clause
in its anti-retaliation provision. See supra note 25.
464. 6 U.S.C. § 1142(aXl)(c) (Supp. 2011).
465. 15 U.S.C. § 2087(a)(1) (Supp. 2011).
466. 15 U.S.C. § 2651 (2006).
467. Brief for Respondent, supra note 41, at 34-35 & n.8.
468. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1337-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
469. Boateng,2007 WL 2572403, at *2; but see supra text accompanying notes 222,409
(regarding the Fourth Circuit's current view on this issue and the value of the district court
opinions within the Fourth Circuit).
470. Id. at *3.
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In O'Neill, the court then noted the following
scarcely be clearer."'
about the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision:
It defines in clear and unambiguous language three specific categories
of conduct for which retaliation is prohibited. And it does so in terms
that make unmistakably clear that the three categories of conduct
comprise the complete universe of protected activity, not just an
exemplary or ejusdem generis listing of such activities. It follows that
the FLSA's protection against retaliation by an employer is triggered
only by the specific conduct set forth in § 215(a)(3) of the Act. Thus,
unless the conduct claimed to be the trigger for the retaliatory act falls
within one of the three specified protected activity categories, the
provision does not apply and there is no actionable retaliation under
activities
But the well-defined universe of protected
the FLSA ....
472
does not encompass such informal, unofficial protests.
Additionally, it is important to note that "filed any complaint" is part
of a list that includes other protected activities, all of which involve
activity with an outside entity or a governmental/judicial entity or
proceeding. 473 This is important because it relates to the canon of
statutory construction that when several items in a list share an
attribute, that "'counsel[s] in favor of interpreting the other items as
possessing that attribute as well. '" 74 Here, because the other protected acts all encompass outside involvement, the phrase "filed any
complaint" should likewise require outside involvement. 475 This canoni
of statutory construction has been used on several occasions by the
Supreme Court. For example, in Beecham v. United States,76 the
Court noted:
This interpretation is supported by the fact that the other three
procedures listed in the exemption clause-pardons, expungements,
and set-asides-are either always or almost always (depending on
whether one considers a federal grant of habeas corpus to be a "setaside," a question we do not now decide) done by the jurisdiction of

471. O'Neill, 956 F. Supp. at 663; but see supra text accompanying notes 222, 409
(regarding the Fourth CircuWs current view on this issue and the value of the district court
opinions within the Fourth Circuit).
472. Id. at 663-64 (emphasis added).
473. Specifically, the three other protected acts are: "institut[ing] or caus[ing] to be
instituted any proceeding under or related to (the FLSA]"; "testiflying] or [being] about to
testify in any such proceeding"; and "serv[ing] or [being] about to serve on an industry
committee." 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
474. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1338 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Beecham v. United
States, 511 U.S. 368, 371 (1994)).
475. Id.
476. 511 U.S. 368 (1994).
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conviction. That several items in a list share an attribute counsels in
favor47of
interpreting the other items as possessing that attribute as
7
well.

Applying that approach here, because the other acts contained in the
FLSA's anti-retaliation provision include involvement with an outside
entity or a governmental/judicial entity or proceeding, the "filed any
complaint" language should similarly be limited in scope.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
summed up the "plain language" argument perfectly:
The Plaintiff has not alleged that she filed a complaint or instituted or
caused to be instituted any proceeding that led to her termination. The
plain language of the statute and Fourth Circuit precedent both make
clear that the protection of § 215(a)(3) is only triggered where an
employee has either filed a complaint or instituted or caused to be
instituted any proceeding under the FLSA, testified or is about to
testify in any FLSA proceeding, or served or is about to serve on an
industry committee. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). Because "filing" a complaint
or "instituting" a proceeding under FLSA contemplates some formal or
official procedure, an internal complaint does not initiate protection of
the statute. Since she failed to allege protected activity satisfying the
terms of the statute, the Plaintiff's claim cannot survive a Motion to
Dismiss.478
This sentiment was echoed in Bartis, where the court noted that the
activities listed in the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision were explicitly
stated, and that those activities included "filing a complaint, instituting
or testifying in a proceeding, or serving on a committee. " 479 The court
then noted that "[w]orkplace complaints are not included [in the
statutory language]. Raising informal objections with one's supervisor
is not included."4s °

477. Id. at 371; see also Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990);
Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., Inc., 432 U.S. 312, 322 (1977); Jarecki v. G.
D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961).
478. Bell-Holcombe, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 764; but see Minor, 669 F.3d 428 (holding that
internal complaints are protected within the Fourth Circuit); but see supra text
accompanying notes 222, 409 (regarding the Fourth Circuit's current view on this issue and
the value of the district court opinions within the Fourth Circuit).
479. 626 F. Supp. 2d at 999.
480. Id. For a more history-based argument regarding why internal complaints are not
protected, see Respondent's Brief, supra note 41, at 20-21. Specifically, counsel for Saint-

Gobain pointed out the followingAs the government notes, § 215(aX3) was preceded by the retaliation provision of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4), which in turn was
preceded by Executive Order No. 6711 (1934). The Executive Order prohibited
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Although one could argue that by using the phrase "filed any
complaint" in addition to the phrase "instituted or caused to be
instituted any proceeding," there was legislative redundancy, Justice
Scalia correctly pointed out during oral argument that this was not the
case because an employee could file a complaint with the Department of
4 81
Labor and still not institute or cause to be instituted any proceeding.
This would occur if the employee complained to the Labor Department,
4
but that agency decided not to pursue the matter. s Similarly, Justice
Roberts used an EEOC analogy, pointing out that an employee can file
a charge with the EEOC, but the EEOC might not institute or cause to
Thus, Congress
be instituted any proceeding against the employer.'
was not being redundant when it used the phrases "filed any complaint"
and "instituted or caused to be instituted" any proceeding.'
The phrase "filed any complaint" does not include internal complaints.
The definitions of the terms "complaint" and "filed" suggest this outcome,
as does the rest of the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision. Despite this,
after Kasten courts will now most likely allow internal complaints to

retaliation against any employee "for making a complaint or giving evidence with
respect to an alleged violation." And § 158(a)(4) prohibited retaliation against any
employee "because he has filed charges or given testimony" under the NLRA.
Despite the change from "making a complaint" to "filed charges," § 158(aX4) was
described in the legislative history as "merely a reiteration" of the Executive
Order. The immediate statutory predecessor of § 215(aX3) thus prohibited
retaliation against any employee who "filed charges," and there is evidence that
Congress understood the words "filed charges" and "making a complaint"
synonymously. Contrary to the government's contention, however, this history
does not support the view that § 215(a)(3) protects internal complaints. Rather,
the phrase "filed charges" clearly contemplates a formal grievance filed with a
governmental authority.
Moreover, the legislative history of the NLRA contains no evidence that
§ 158(a)(4) protected employees who "filed charges" against their employers
internally (if that counterintuitive notion is even possible). The committee report
on which the government relies cited three decisions of the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) under the 1934 Executive Order that "attested" to the
"need for this provision." Each decision involved retaliation for either a complaint
to an agency, or testimony given in [a] judicial proceeding]. And the colloquy the
government cites between Senators Wagner and Hastings concerned the
possibility that § 158(a)(4) would protect employees who "file charges maliciously,'-a concern that obviously pertained to the filing of charges with a governmental authority.
Id. at 20-21 (citations omitted).
481. See Oral Argument, supra note 22, at 13:29.
482. Id.
483. Id. at 34:18.
484. 29 U.S.C. § 215.
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constitute protected activity.'
Nonetheless, because the majority in
Kasten claimed to have left this question open, perhaps the Court will
eventually (and specifically) resolve this important issue of what,
exactly, constitutes "protected activity" under the FLSA's anti-retaliation
provision.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court's heart might have been in the right
place when it decided that oral complaints are protected under the
FLSA, the result of the Court's apparent decision to cover complaints
made to employers about potential FLSA violations appears to be based
more on policy than on the FLSA's language."' By stretching the
phrase "filed any complaint" beyond its ordinary meaning, the Court
provided more protection to employees, but it did so at the expense of the
FLSA's text.
The FLSA's anti-retaliation provision is not worded as broadly as other
anti-retaliation provisions, and any argument that the interpretation of
those provisions should apply to the FLSA is without merit. Similarly,
the fact that Congress has not amended the FLSA's anti-retaliation
provision to include an opposition clause provides further support that
internal complaints are not protected. Also, simply because a statute's
policies and purposes might favor a broad interpretation, that does not
give courts the right to "interpret" those statutes by ignoring their
language. And finally, as Justice Scalia pointed out, applying ordinary
canons of statutory construction to the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision's language and context yields the result that internal complaints are
7
not

protected.48

Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics

Corp.48 is an example of putting policy ahead of language. It is
Congress's job to make the law, and by protecting these internal
complaints (despite claiming not to have done so), the Court in Kasten
usurped this role.

485. See supra note 43.
486. Admittedly, the Court claimed that it was not answering the issue that is the
focus of this Article; however, by concluding that the plaintiffs internal complaints could
be protected, and by establishing a test to determine when complaints made to employers
are protected, the logical implication is that internal complaints are, in fact, protected
under the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision.
487. Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1337-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
488. 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).

